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Maine’s public lots were originally reserved from conveyances of
townships*1 of public domain and were held by the state for the benefit
of schools in the towns which would or could someday be created among
the unorganized townships of the state. Many towns came into existence
and inherited their public lots for the purposes for which the lots were
reserved. Unlike many other states, however, almost half of the land area
of Maine has never been incorporated into towns. Because of the great
number of townships which have never been incorporated into towns,
there are now approximately 400,000 acres of public lots owned by
the state. These lands are situated in eight counties across the northern
and eastern areas of Maine at the rate of 1,000 acres per township. Most
of the townships are totally uninhabited today.
Beginning in 1850, the state sold certain timber rights on approxi
mately 320,000 acres of the public lots. Until very recently, the state
asserted substantially no rights with respect to the public lots on which
the timber rights were sold. The remainder of the public lots were
managed for the benefit of the possible inhabitants of future towns. Thus,
the state treated the public lots on which timber rights were originally
sold as essentially the private property of the successors in interest of
the original grantees of the timber rights. Even with respect to the public
lots on which the state had not sold the timber, no significant effort
was made to make the public lots available for the broad range of
activities which can occur on public lands. Only small sums have been
made available for the management of the public lots, and whatever
proceeds have been generated by the land were placed in a trust fund
to be held indefinitely, awaiting the settlement and incorporation of this
vast forested area. Excluding rights of way for public highways, there is
more acreage of public lots than there is in all other lands owned by the
state of Maine for all other public purposes combined, but for more than
a century, and well into a new era of growing pressure upon public land
* Assistant Attorney General, State of Maine; B.S., Union College (N .Y .), 1962;
LL.B., Southern Methodist University, 1965.
1 The expression “township” refers to a tract o f land laid off by the early
surveyors o f the state’s land mass. A typical township contains thirty-six square
miles and is in the shape of a square, six miles in length on each side.
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resources throughout the nation, this massive quantity of public lands
lay essentially dormant and unused.
There is a direct and intricate relationship between the history of
public lots and first, the history of the disposition of Maine’s public
domain, second, the history of the gradual decline of Maine during the
middle of the nineteenth century as a major national power and a prime
frontier, and third, the growth of the pulp and paper industry in Maine.
The origin of the public lots, the sale of the timber upon them, the manner
in which they have been administered, and the rationale for the state’s
having asserted so few rights with respect to these lands on behalf of
the public at large are more appropriately the subject of a political and
economic history of the state than a legal analysis of deeds and statutes.
Yet the discernment of the “intent” of the state as grantor in deeds and
as enactor of legislation makes the dividing line often difficult to track.
This article, nevertheless, represents an effort to stay as clearly to the
side of legal analysis as the mechanics of that kind of analysis permit.
As the body of the article discusses in more detail, the specific legal
framework surrounding the public lots is somewhat peculiar to Maine,
perhaps to the same degree that the public lots themselves are intertwined
with Maine’s particular history and role in the development of the
United States. Nevertheless, there are basic similarities between the
Maine experience and that of other states, and students of the develop
ment of public land law on the federal level will no doubt see Maine’s
experience in a broader perspective.2 Moreover, the current legislative
and administrative activities with respect to the public lots reflect, and
are motivated by, many of the same concerns and policies which under
lie public regulation and administration of natural resources in other
states and by the federal government.
This article is an analysis of some of the more significant actual and
potential legal rights and responsibilities of the state with respect to
these lands. It does not, as indeed it could not, purport to answer every
question about these diverse and peculiar public lands. Instead, it
focuses primarily upon certain fundamental problems and questions
raised by the Articles of Separation (a part of Maine’s Constitution),
the deeds of public domain reserving the public lots, and the deeds
granting the right to cut and carry away timber and grass from the public
lots.
The subject matter of this article originally appeared in the form of
a report prepared by this writer on behalf of the Department of the
Attorney General.3 The report was completed in September 1972,
2 See P. G ates, H istory of P ublic Land D evelopment (1968).
3 For the purposes of this article, portions o f the original report which involve
issues now in litigation Cushing, et a!., v. Lund, et al., Kennebec Super. Ct. Doc. No.
1740-73 (filed May 16, 1973) ) have not been revised.
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although it was not released to the public until January, 1973. Following
its release, a bill was introduced into the regular session of the 106th
Legislature4 which proposed certain fundamental changes in the ad
ministration of the public lots by the state. Certain legal questions about
the bill were submitted to the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court
and resulted in an Opinion of the Justices5 resolving one major issue
concerning the public lots by authorizing a substantially broader use of
those lands than had ever been attempted by the legislature in the past.
The public lots raise legal problems in an area of law which is
evolving quickly and on a number of fronts. With only those warranties
which customarily accompany issues currently in the heat of judicial and
even legislative debate, therefore, what follows are some questions and
observations concerning these remarkable public assets.

I.

T h e P u b l ic L o ts

A . The Historical Perspective
At the close of the Revolutionary War, the Commonwealth of Massa
chusetts owned in fee simple vast amounts of land, including most of what
is now the state of Maine. This land was largely uninhabited, uncultivated
and, so long as it belonged to the state, untaxable. The policy adopted
by Massachusetts with respect to these public lands (and subsequently
followed by Maine) was that it was in the best interest of the people
to dispose of the public lands, primarily in order to bring about
settlement and development. Since the lands were of some value, a
secondary but significant motivation appears to have been to raise money
from their sale to operate the government and to discharge indebtedness
incurred during and after the Revolutionary War. Lands were also
occasionally given to endow schools or otherwise promote the cultural
and spiritual well-being of the people.
Beginning as early as 1785,6 the United States began setting apart
the center lot of each township in its western territories for the main
tenance of public schools, the purpose being to promote “good govern
ment and the happiness of mankind by the spread of religion and
knowledge.” 7 Undoubtedly for similar purposes and, of course, to
further promote settlement of lands which it owned, Massachusetts
resolved at approximately the same time that out of every township sold,
there should be reserved four lots of 320 acres each for “public uses” :
one for the first settled minister, one for the use of the ministry, one
4 L.D. 1812, H.P. 1382, 106th Legis. (1973).
5 308 A.2d 253 (Me. 1973). See p. 230 infra.
e See Cooper v. Roberts, 59 U.S. (17 H ow .) 178 (1855).
7 Id. at 178.
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for a public grammar school, and one for the benefit of public education
in general as the legislature thereafter might direct8 or, in some instances,
the latter lot was reserved for future appropriation by the legislature.9
These latter lots came to be known as the “state lots” and were largely
sold off by the legislature of Massachusetts (and later of Maine) pursuant
to private and special legislation.10 Instead of 1280 acres in each town
ship conveyed by Massachusetts, therefore, there typically remains re
served for public uses today only 960 acres per township. Pursuant to
statutes directing the sale from time to time, by lottery or otherwise,
of Massachusetts’s public domain in Maine, Massachusetts delivered
deeds to townships reserving the public lots and designating in the deeds
the uses for which each lot was reserved.11
When Maine became a state, it came into ownership of approximately
one half of the unsold, and largely unsurveyed, public domain in what
had been the district of Maine. Some of these lands were owned by
Maine and some jointly with Massachusetts. The Articles of Separation,12
initially merely an act of the legislature of Massachusetts authorizing
statehood for Maine, provided, in part, that:13
[I]n all grants hereafter to be made by either State of unleased land with
in the said District [of Maine], the same reservations shall be made for
the benefit o f Schools, and o f the Ministry, as have heretofore been
usual, in grants made by this Commonwealth.

The Articles also declared that:14
These terms and conditions, as here set forth, when the said District
shall become a separate and Independent State, shall, ipso facto, be
incorporated into, and become and be part of any Constitution, provisional
or other, under which the Government of said proposed State shall,
8 Ch. 40, [1786] Laws and Resolves of Massachusetts.
»M „ ch. 80 [1787],
to See, e.g., id., ch. 64 [1821].
11 A typical deed provision reads:
[RJeserving also four Lots of three hundred and twenty acres each in
every Township or Tract of six miles square, for the following purposes,
to wit: One for the first settled Minister, one for the use o f the Ministry,
one for the use of Schools, and one for the future appropriation o f the
General Court. Said Lots to average in goodness and situation with the
other Lots o f the respective Townships.
Deed from Massachusetts to William Bingham, on file in the Maine State Archives.
The reference to the “General Court” is, o f course, to the Massachusetts legislature.
13 M e . Const, art. X, §5; The Articles of Separation are contained in the fifth
section of article X o f the Constitution of Maine, but are rarely printed with the
remainder of the constitution. See M e . C onst, art. X, §7.
13 M e . C onst, art. X, §7. The reference to “land not yet located” can be taken

to mean unsurveyed land,
w Id.
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at any time hereafter, be administered; subject, however, to be modified,
or annulled by the agreement of the Legislature of both the said States;
but by no other power or body whatsoever.

After separation, the Maine legislature did not immediately develop
a comprehensive program for the administration of public lots15 or the
administration and settlement of the public lands. In 1824, however,
the legislature enacted two significant pieces of legislation. First, the
legislature provided that “in all cases where lands have been granted
or reserved for the use of the ministry, or the first settled minister in any
town in the state, where the fee in such lands has not already be
come vested in some particular parish within such town, or in some
individual,” 16 the fee was to be vested in the “inhabitants of such towns,”
subject to the supervision of a board of trustees constituting and having
the powers of a corporation,17 comprised of various municipal officers.
The trustees had the power to administer and to sell the public lots and
were required to use them, the income therefrom, and the proceeds
from their sale for ministerial and school purposes in a specified manner,
and to give an annual accounting to the town. The legislature expressly
retained the right to alter or annul the powers of the trustees over these
public lots. With two significant exceptions, the basic framework estab
lished by this Act for the administration of school and ministerial lands
by the towns in which they are located remains the law today.18 The
statute then and now deals with the administration of ministerial and
school lands in incorporated towns by the municipal trustees but does
not purport to regulate the administration of public lots by the state in
plantations or unorganized areas of the state.
In addition, in the first of many acts styled (or approximately styled)
“An Act to promote the sale and settlement of public lands,” the legis
lature created the office of “Land Agent,” vested in that office certain ad15 The acreage reserved in grants by Massachusetts and by Maine for public
uses or for the benefit o f schools or the ministry are referred to in this article as
the “public lots” or “reserved lots” and are to be distinguished from “public lands”
or the “public domain” which includes all lands owned by the sovereign, including
the lands from which the public lots were reserved.
16 Ch. 254, Pub. Laws of 1824. Hereinafter, all references to “Public Laws”
and “Resolves” are to those of Maine unless otherwise indicated.
17 This corporation was, and is today, unquestionably a “private” corporation
within the meaning of Yarmouth v. North Yarmouth, 34 Me. 411 (1852), and
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). Grants to the
corporation are contracts which may not be constitutionally impaired. See note 118
infra and accompanying text.
18 M e . R ev. Stat. A nn . tit. 13, §3161 et seq. (1964). The two exceptions are (1)
the ministerial lands (and funds) were directed to school purposes in 1832, and
(2 ), Chapter 628 (ii) of the Public Laws of 1973 repealed the power of the
towns to sell their public lots. See p. 230 infra.
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ministrative powers over the public lands (including the right to sell
grass and timber from year to year), and provided grants of small tracts
to actual settlers.19 The legislature also declared that:20
There shall be reserved in every township, suitable for settlement, one
thousand acres of land to average in quality and situation with the
other land in such township, to be appropriated to such public uses, for
the exclusive benefit of such town, as the Legislature may hereafter direct.

This provision (1 ) changed the reserved acreage from 1280 acres to
1000 acres; (2 ) specified the reservation of a single large quantity of
land, rather than four smaller ones; (3 ) appropriated the entire 1000
acres to such public uses as the legislature might direct; and (4 ) made
the town, which might ultimately be created within the township from
which the public lot was reserved, the exclusive beneficiary of the reser
vation. Each of these four changes represented a departure by Maine
from the specific pattern of reservations of public lots which had been
usual in grants by Massachusetts, but Maine did not amend the Articles
of Separation nor did it seek or obtain the consent of Massachusetts
to make these changes.21 This provision, with relatively minor changes,
remained in effect during the disposition of Maine’s vast areas of public
lands and the reservation of the public lots.
In 1831, the legislature passed an “Act to modify the terms and condi
tions of the Act for Separation.” 22 This legislation, which was made
subject to the consent of the legislature of Massachusetts, sought to give
to Maine the power to control the trustees of ministerial and school
lands in towns incorporated by Massachusetts (prior to separation)
and sought to vest in the legislature of Maine the power to23
direct the income of any fund arising from the proceeds of the sale of
land, required to be reserved for the benefit of the Ministry, to be applied
for the benefit of primary schools, in the town in which such land is
situate, where the fee in such land has not already become vested in
some particular Parish within such town, or in some individual.

The Articles of Separation provided that all grants of land by Mas
sachusetts “having to have effect” in Maine were to continue in full
force and effect after separation. Accordingly, an amendment of the
Article was necessary to change the uses for which public lots were re
served in towns incorporated by Massachusetts. Massachusetts consented
19 Ch. 280, Pub. Laws o f 1824.
Id. at §8.
21 Massachusetts did not object to the changes, and, in fact, joint conveyances
by Maine and Massachusetts thereafter provided for 1000-acre reservations for
public uses. See, e.g., the conveyance in Hammond v. Morrell, 33 Me. 300 (1851)
22 Ch. 492, Pub. Laws of 1831.
23 Id. at §2.
20
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to this legislation thereby amending the Articles of Separation, and the
following year Maine “directed and required” that the proceeds from the
sale, as well as the income from funds created with the proceeds from the
sale, of any lands reserved for the ministry or for the first settled minister
(except those which had vested in a particular parish or individual) be
“annually applied to the support of primary schools in such town.” 24
This law remains in effect today,25 and controls the purposes for which
the public lots are required to be used in towns throughout the state
excepting only some of the older towns where ministerial or parish lots
had become privately vested prior to 1824.26
As public lots were reserved from the many land grants by Maine
and Massachusetts, and the two jointly, a substantial quantity of land
began to accumulate— different from public domain but still under
public control— until the townships became incorporated and the
originally intended beneficiaries came into existence. These lands were
placed under the jurisdiction of the Land Agent in 1831,27 but a series
of enactments shifted custody of, and powers with respect to, these lands
back and forth between county commissioners, county agents, the Land
Agent, and plantations until 1852 when all public lots in the unincorpo
rated areas of the state (including plantations and unorganized town
ships) came to rest in the Land Agent.2®Simultaneously with these read
justments in custody and powers came the effort by Maine to assert juris
diction and power over public lots reserved in grants by Massachusetts.
This effort succeeded in a court decision in 1839 sustaining Maine’s
power in this regard.29
While this article does not purport to be a history of social or political
developments in Maine during the period in question, the important
steps taken with respect to the public lots beginning with legislation in
1850 should to some extent be interpreted in light of the events and at
titudes of the day. For a number of years, timber was stolen in great
quantities from much of the public lands of the state, including the
24 Ch. 39, §2, Pub. Laws of 1832.

25 M e . R ev. Stat. A nn . tit. 13, §3167 (1974).
26 It was thought by many that the 1831 amendment authorized the diversion of
all public lots from ministerial and school purposes to school purposes alone, and
that if any use other than schools were desired, the amendment to the Articles of
Separation was precedent for the proposition that the consent of Massachusetts
would be required. In fact, the amendment was extremely narrow in scope, and its
precedental value for purposes o f this discussion has been completely discounted
by the Opinion o f the Justices, 308 A .2d 253 (Me. 1973).
27 Ch. 510, Pub. Laws of 1831.
28 Ch. 33, Pub. Laws of 1842; ch. 149, Pub. Laws of 1845; ch. 217, Pub. Laws
of 1846; ch. 82, Pub. Laws of 1848; ch. 196, Pub. Laws of 1850; ch. 284, Pub.
Laws o f 1852.
29State v. Cutler, 16 Me. 349 (1839).
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public lots.30 The Land Agents annually reported the widespread timber
trespasses on the public domain.31 The Land Agents (and other agents
of the state having custody over the public lots during the 1840’s) had
the power to grant permits for one six-ox team in any one year32 to cut
timber on the public lots and the responsibility to prevent trespass upon
the public lots. Proceeds from timber sales and timber trespass were
held by the state treasurer in separate accounts for each township, to
be turned over to the towns when they came into being. The permitting
system and the power and responsibility to prevent trespass were ap
parently inadequate to the task of preserving the value of these lands.
By 1854, it was reported that “most of the timber” on certain public
lots had been taken off by trespassers, that the value of such public lots
was greatly diminished, and that “trespassing, to some considerable
extent, will be carried on, while the State holds the lands; it cannot be
entirely stopped.” 33 Part of the problem undoubtedly was that the
state could not afford or determined that it was economically not feasible
to create and employ the massive law enforcement capability which
would have been required to prevent timber trespasses in much of the
remote and then extremely wild public domain. In addition, the tres
passers themselves, who were often large timber operators, may have
exerted political pressures to thwart preventive measures.34
Beginning even before its separation from Massachusetts and con
tinuing at least until the Civil War, Maine enjoyed virtually uninterrupted
economic growth. Maine was considered (and considered itself) a prime
frontier in the future growth of this country. The population of Maine
grew from 90,000 in 1790 to 600,000 in 1860, almost 100,000 during
each decade.35 The period from 1840 to 1860, in particular, has been
referred to as Maine’s economic “golden era”.36 It was widely felt that
the key to continued growth and prosperity lay in the continued settle
ment of the state and this objective seems to have been universally
30 See, e.g., Maine Land A gents’ R eports, 1840-56, Report of W. P. Panott,
1840, at 67. The act of stealing timber is hereinafter referred to as “timber
trespass.”
31 See, e.g., id., Report of L. Bradley, 1842, at 5-6.
32 Ch. 149, Pub. Laws of 1845.
33 Maine L and A gents’ R eports, 1840-56, Report of G.C. Getchell, 1854, at 1,
7-8.

34 The United States suffered the same depredations and Congress was subjected
to similar political pressures with regard to the western territories. For a history
of efforts by the federal government to prevent timber trespassers on the western
lands, see P. G ates, H istory of P ublic L and L aw D evelopment (1968).
35 See generally, Preface to W. W illiamson, T he H istory of the State of
M aine, (1832) and H atch, M aine: A H istory, ch. 23 (1919).
36 Proceedings of the Sesquicentennial C olloquium, E xplorations in
M aine H istory 42 (1970).
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desired.37 Many people in the state seem to have fully expected that
this objective would be attained.
The state Land Agent and the legislature had broken the wildlands
into broad categories referred to as “timber lands” and “settling lands.”
While these categories do not appear to have been treated in a rigidly
separate manner, it had been recognized since the separation of Maine
from Massachusetts that some portions of the wildlands were not well
suited for settlement and that the timber on those lands represented the
substance of even their long term value to the state. Nevertheless, the
fundamental and broad view appears to have been that much, if not
most, of the wildlands were suitable for settlement and that Maine would,
in fact, be substantially settled. There began to appear by about 1850
some indications, however, that the prospects for settlement of Maine’s
wildlands were doubtful. In 1848, the Land Agent reported to the legis
lature that with respect to much of the public domain, “the value of the
land consists entirely in its timber, and that generations to come will not
furnish a demand for it for any other purpose. . . .” 38 Even with re
spect to those portions of the public lands which had been designated
specifically as settling lands, the Land Agent felt that “the truth is,
that the situation of these [settling] lands far to the north, their distance
from market towns, the injury of the wheat crop by the weevil, the rot
of the potato, all conspire to retard very seriously the progress of
their settlement.” 39 He noted that “while our wild lands are unoccupied
or unimproved they are of no more value than an equal area of the
ocean” 40 and urged the legislature to give, rather than sell, land to actual
settlers.
One fundamental element contributing to the changing picture was the
tendency toward emigration westward. While there was emigration from
Maine from the earliest days of statehood, the rate obviously was far
behind the rate of immigration into Maine. The rate of emigration from
Maine was about to accelerate, however, with the California gold rush of
1849. Governor Hubbard, in his message to the legislature May 14, 1850,
said:41
A t this time, while the tendency to emigration is so strong, it becomes
doubly important that our people should be furnished with inducements
37 See Message o f the Governor, June 2, 1820, [1820] Resolves of Maine at 11.
38 M aine L and A gents’ R eports, 1840-56, Report o f S. Cony, 1848, at 5.
3»W . at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
41 Message of the Governor, May 14, 1850, [1850] Resolves of Maine at 313.
By 1853, there was a pronounced concern about the emigration o f “hundreds and
thousands” of the “young and enterprising portion o f our population” and the fear
o f an exhaustion of the “vigor of the body politic.” See Message of the Governor,
[1853] Resolves of Maine at 51.
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to stay at home. It may be questionable whether any we can offer will
accomplish the object. It is a common remark, that it would be better for
us to give our lands away, than to suffer them to remain unoccupied.
Would it not be well to make the experiment?

The legislature responded to this sentiment in 1850 by directing the Land
Agent to select up to ten townships per year to be sold to settlers at a low
price of fifty cents per acre with no cash payment and the purchase price
payable entirely in labor upon public roads in the townships involved.42
Compounding these problems was the developing tendency by Massa
chusetts to refuse to cooperate in any respect with the development of
her portion of Maine’s wildlands (including the part jointly owned), and
to resort to circuitous legal arrangements by which private persons could
enjoy profits from Massachusetts’s lands, yet the fee to the lands re
mained in Massachusetts and was therefore not taxable under the Articles
of Separation.43
Finally, the year 1850 was characterized by the state treasurer as
the turning point in Maine’s struggle to discharge its public debt.44
All lands of the state not otherwise appropriated were set apart in 1850
to discharge the public debt.45
In an atmosphere clearly dominated by the desire to promote the
settlement of Maine and to preserve from trespass a principal endowment
or attraction provided to settlers, the legislature enacted in 1850 a sig
nificant piece of legislation concerning the public lots.46 That act again
vested in the Land Agent the care and custody of the public lots (taking
it away from agents within the counties) and47
authorized and directed [the Land Agent] to sell for cash, the right to
cut and carry away the timber and grass from off the reserved lands . . .
excepting however the grass growing upon the improvements of any
actual settler, the right to continue until the tract or township shall be
incorporated or organized for plantation purposes . . . .

This authority and instruction extended to all located public lots and to
all public lots thereafter reserved in grants by Maine or by Massachusetts
42 Ch. 206, §3, Pub. Laws of 1850. The Land Agent noted that this price was
“low”, but he recommended that the state adopt a policy o f selling land at low
prices to actual settlers. M aine Land Agents’ R eports, 1840-56, Report o f S.
Cony, 1850, at 7.
43 This dispute culminated in the deed of 1855 from Massachusetts to Maine of
all of Massachusetts’s interest in territories in Maine, See p. 228 infra. The subject
of the dispute is treated in R eport of the F orest Com m ’r, H istory of the W ild
lands of M aine (1908).
44 Treasurer’s Report of 1850, L egis. D oc. o f 1850, at 12.
45 Ch. 339, [1850] Resolves of Maine 289. Funds from the public lots were not
included in this resolve because they were expressly “otherwise appropriated” to
be held in the treasury awaiting the intended beneficiaries.
46 Ch. 196, Pub. Laws of 1850.
47 Id. at §2.
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or by both jointly, whether or not located.48 The Land Agent was directed
to sell the foregoing rights to the person or persons who owned the tract
or township “at the same rate per acre as the tract or township shall or
may have sold for, making, however, such reasonable deduction for the
soil as in the opinion of the agent should be made.” 49 The Land Agent
was also directed to procure the location of the lands for public uses in
land theretofore and thereafter sold by the state, unless (1 ) the Land
Agent and the proprietors could agree on a location, in which event the
agreement was to be reduced to writing and filed in the Land Agent’s
office, or (2 ) the proprietors themselves had theretofore taken steps to
set apart and locate the public lots under existing laws.50
The act also required the county agents to turn over to the state
treasurer the funds in their hands for each tract or township. The Land
Agent was directed to “open an account with each township” and there
to debit and credit expenses and income from specific sources (including
the proceeds from the sales of the timber and grass) and annually turn
over to the treasurer the balance in each account. The treasurer was re
quired to keep the accounts separate and intact, again debiting ex
penses and crediting income, and the balance of each account was di
rected to be “paid over to the authorities provided by law to receive the
same when they shall hereafter exist, until which time the funds arising
from said reserved lands shall remain in the treasury.” 51 Finally, the act
vested in the assessors of plantations custody and control of the public
lots within the plantations and directed that income be invested for the

48 The exception pertaining to the grass on improvements by actual settlers was
not expressly applicable to unlocated lots. The expression “located public lot”
hereinafter refers to a public lot which has been partitioned from the townships or
tract from which it was reserved. Partition typically occurred by court proceedings
to “locate the public lot or by mutual agreement between the state and the proprie
tors of the township.” “Unlocated public lots” refer to those lots prior to their
location, and represent, in substance, a common and undivided interest of the
state in a township from which the reservation was made.
49 Ch. 196, §2, Pub. Laws o f 1850. It is interesting to note that many o f the
proprietors of those townships did not buy the timber and grass cutting rights.
The reasons for neglecting the favorable provisions of law are apparent
when it is seen that this undivided interest has not been paid for, and that
a joint ownership with the State is a matter of pecuniary advantage so
long as the State willingly acquiesces and makes no claim for the value
annually pocketed by her co-tenant.

M aine Land A gents’ R eports, 1840-56, Report of I.R. Clark, 1855, at 3-4.
50 Presumably referring to the provisions of M e . R ev. Stat. ch. 3 §14 (1841)
originally enacted by ch. 480, §2, Pub. Laws of 1830, authorizing the proprietors
to institute such proceedings.
51 Ch. 196, §6, Pub. Laws of 1850.
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benefit of the plantation and interest on the invested principal be applied
for the use of schools.52
This act established the basic framework within which the state ad
ministered the public lots in the unincorporated areas, and the income
from them, from 1850 to the present. Pursuant to the act (and its
statutory successors) the right to cut and carry away the timber and grass
from approximately 320,000 acres of public lots was sold between 1850
and 1890. In spite of the directive in the act to locate all of the then un
located public lots, approximately 120,000 acres remain unlocated today.
The increasing problems between Maine and Massachusetts concerning
the lands in Maine owned by Massachusetts (and by the two states
jointly) were solved by Maine’s acquisition of all of the remaining in
terest of Massachusetts in its lands in Maine.53 The deed, dated November
23, 1853, conveyed all the right, title, and interest of Massachusetts in
all lands in Maine, whether described or not described in the deed, with
specified exceptions. It also provided that all lands reserved by Massachu
setts in any townships for public uses54
are hereby conveyed to said State of Maine to be held in accordance with
and subservient to the provisions and stipulations contained in the act
relating to the separation of the District of Maine from Massachusetts
proper and forming the same into a separate and independent State,
passed June 19, 1819—
And that this conveyance is in no wise to impair or invalidate the obliga
tion of the provisions in said act of separation, contained for setting apart
and reserving lands to educational and religious uses.

The deed itself imposed no restrictions on Maine respecting the public
lots. It merely recited that the public lots were to be held subject to,
and nothing in the deed was intended to alter, obligations imposed by
the Articles of Separation. Subject to the provisions of the Articles of
Separation, therefore, Maine stood in the shoes of Massachusetts in
relation to all public lots reserved in grants by Massachusetts. In other
words, distinctions between Maine and Massachusetts with respect to
all public lots, regardless of the sovereign which reserved them, were
52 This provision was repealed two years later and the care and custody of the
lots in plantations was given to the Land Agent. Ch. 284, Pub. Laws of 1852.
53 The legislative history of this acquisition may be traced as follows: ch. 413,
[1852] Resolves o f Maine, authorizing the Governor of Maine to lay the state’s
grievances before the Massachusetts legislature; ch. 6, [1853] Resolves of Maine,
authorizing the Land Agent to negotiate with Massachusetts; ch. 57, [1853]
Resolves of Maine, establishing a commission to negotiate details; and ch. 80,
[1853] Resolves o f Maine (Sp. Sess.) ratifying and confirming the contract. Sales
of public land were generally suspended during this period. Ch. 64, [1853] Resolves
of Maine; ch. 83, [1853] Resolves of Maine (Sp. Sess.).
54 M e . H. D oc. N o . 12, at 10 (1854).
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abolished except to the extent that the Articles of Separation themselves
imposed obligations upon Maine.
In 1876, the legislature directed that the Land Agent should “bring
to a termination all unsettled business connected with the land office,
relating to the lands belonging to the state; to the end that the office may
be discontinued at the earliest practicable moment.” 55 By 1878, the
Land Agent reported that all of the public lands had been sold, “thus
leaving the State devoid of its once rich and extensive landed posses
sions,” 56 that in all incorporated towns, fee simple title to the reserved
lots had vested in the towns and that substantially all that remained for
the Land Agent was the care of the public lots in unincorporated areas,
“no authority existing for their sale, but only for the sale of the timber
and grass growing upon them.” 57 In 1891, the Land Agent was made
Forest Commissioner for the State of Maine,58 and in 1923 the title
“State Land Agent” was abolished.59
As the public lands were sold, many townships were laid off into
100 acre (or larger) lots and sold by the lot. No reservation of any
portion of a public lot is contained in such conveyances, the public lot
in those townships being that portion of the township marked or laid
off by the Land Agent as the public lot within the township and not cut
into smaller lots conveyed by the state.60 Both Maine and Massachusetts
frequently conveyed public domain, however, by townships or by portions
of townships. In addition, it was common for townships, or portions
thereof, to be conveyed in fractional undivided interests. Thus, a deed
of public domain might convey an undivided quarter part of the northern
half of a township. Similar fractional undivided (or divided) interests
in the same township would subsequently be conveyed until a 100 per
cent interest in the entire township was conveyed.
Deeds conveying such fractional undivided interests also provided
for the reservation of that proportionate part of the public lot which
conveyed interest in the township bore to 1000 acres. For example, the
deed conveying an undivided quarter part of the northern half of a
township would reserve for public uses a total of 125 acres, that figure
being one quarter of one half of 1000. In addition, the timber and grass
deeds conveying many of the public lots conveyed fractional undivided
ss Ch. 119, Pub. Laws of 1876.

56 M aine L and A gents’ R eports, 1874-91, Report of E.C. Burleigh, 1878, at 5.
57 Id. at 6. The Land Agent also noted that with “reference to those townships
far removed from settlements, no questions can probably arise for a long course o f
years, if indeed ever.” Id.
58 Ch. 100, §1, Pub. Laws of 1891.
59 Ch. 196, Pub. Laws o f 1923.
60 See, e.g., ch. 380, §2, Pub. Laws of 1830.
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interests in the cutting rights. Thus, a deed might convey the right to
cut and carry away the timber from an undivided half of a public lot.
As the public lands were sold off, public lots were reserved from sub
stantially all of the townships.61 Pursuant to statutes in effect from 1824
to 1973, the state’s ownership terminated when the township or tract from
which the public lot or lots were reserved became incorporated.62 The
state therefore owns and administers only those public lots which are
situated in plantations and in unorganized areas of the state. Of the
public lots owned and administered by the state, some have been located
and others remain unlocated within the township. Timber and grass
deeds were delivered pursuant to the 1850 act with respect to both
located and unlocated public lots. There are today four categories in
the approximately 398,000 acres of public lots owned and administered
by the state: (1 ) located public lots where timber and grass conveyances
were not made; (2 ) unlocated public lots where timber and grass
conveyances were not made; (3 ) located public lots where timber and
grass conveyances were made; and (4 ) unlocated public lots where tim
ber and grass conveyances were made.63 Some of the public lots have
been sold,64 but most public lots reserved from townships or tracts are
still owned by the state.
B.

The State and the Public Lots
In 1973 the legislature proposed to enact and in fact did substantially
enact a bill which makes sweeping changes in the manner and purpose
for which the public lots in the unincorporated areas of the state are to
be administered and held by the state.65 Chapter 628 of the Public Laws
of 1973 (1 ) declared that the public lots were to be held as “state assets”
for the benefit of the state of Maine, deleting references to any future
town; (2) converted public lots essentially into a system of multiple
use state forests to be managed not necessarily for “the greatest dollar
return” but for recreation, wildlife management, and the like as well as
for the production of wood products; (3 ) ceased the practice of placing
61 In some instances, the public lots were not expressly reserved, or less than
1000 acres were reserved. See, e.g., Blake v. Bangor Sav. Bank, 76 Me. 377 (1884);
In re Ring, 104 Me. 544, 72 A. 548 (1908).
62State v. Mullen, 97 Me. 331, 54 A. 841 (1903).
63 For a statistical report on the quantity, location and status of the public lots,
see State F orestry D ep ’t ., R eport on P ublic R eserved L ots (1963). It appears
that a few townships on which the right to cut timber and grass was sold subse
quently became organized as plantations or incorporated into towns.
64 Id. See also ch. 8, 13 and 16, Resolves of 1971.
65 Ch. 628, Pub. Laws of 1973, codified at M e. R ev. Stat. A nn . tit. 1, §72(13)
(Supp. 1973); tit. 12, §§512, 514 (1974); tit. 13, §§3161, 3167 (1974); tit. 30,
§§4151-156, 4159, 4161-166 (Supp. 1973).
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all income generated by the public lots into an account to be held until
the eventual incorporation of towns and provided for the income to go
to the management of the public lots; and (4 ) required in the location of
presently unlocated public lots that such factors as scenic quality, public
recreation needs, and the preservation of wildlife habitat and historic
significance be considered as well as the value of the lands in timber and
mineral resources. The act also repealed the power of towns to sell their
public lots, thus insuring that in those Maine towns which still possess
their public lots, the land will be preserved.
In addition to the provisions enacted into Chapter 628 of the Public
Laws of 1973, L.D. 181266 proposed to grant the power to the executive
branch of the state government to sell, purchase, and exchange public
lots in order to assemble large contiguous quantities of land and de
clared that:67
[T]he requirement that the public reserved lands shall be used for the
exclusive benefit o f the township from which they were reserved is
abolished and the sale, acquisition, assembly and reassembly of public re
served lands may proceed without the necessity of retaining public re
served lands in each tract, township or plantation.

The Opinion of the Justices6869dealt with the powers of the state with re
spect to the public lots. In order to analyze properly what the Supreme
Judicial Court said and to appreciate what further questions might be
raised by its answers to the Senate, some perspective upon the develop
ment of the case law prior to that time is helpful.
In the first year of Maine’s statehood, the Supreme Judicial Court
confronted a fundamental title problem created by the reservation or
dedication of a public lot. In Shapleigh v. Pilsbury,ea plaintiffs were the
grantees from Massachusetts subject to an early form of grant requiring
the grantees to set off public lots for ministerial purposes, which the
grantees had done. The lots were then occupied by a trespasser and
plaintiffs sued for his removal, maintaining that the setting apart of the
lots was not a valid conveyance because the beneficiaries were not in
existence and, since there was no valid conveyance, the plaintiffs re
tained the fee and could remove a trespasser. The trespasser maintained
that the reservation or dedication of the public lots was a valid convey
ance of the fee, that the beneficiaries were not yet in existence, that until
they came into existence the fee was “in abeyance.” Thus while the fee
was in abeyance, plaintiffs were strangers to the title and, in effect, had
66 Portions o f the original bill, L.D. 1812, were not enacted by ch. 628.
67 L.D. 1812, 106th Legis. (1973).
68 308 A.2d 253 (Me. 1973).
69 1 Me. 271 (1821).
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no standing to remove the defendant from the lots. The trespasser sug
gested that if anyone could maintain such an action, it was the state.
The court upheld the conveyance as a dedication for charitable pur
poses, noting the benevolent intention underlying the dedication (and
numerous other charitable grants) would be frustrated by an alternative
conclusion. However, the court gave the plaintiffs (the grantees) custody
and care of the lots, not to sell, but to retain until the originally contem
plated beneficiaries came into existence. The court’s holding should be
considered in light of the fact that the case predated the law adopted in
1831 by which Maine expressly assumed custody and control of the pub
lic lots.70 Nevertheless, the case referred to the public lots as having been
reserved or dedicated for charitable purposes and treated the public lots
as a charitable trust.
The question of the legal effect of the reservations and, more precisely,
of the rights and responsibilities of the state and of private persons
during the interim period between the reservation of public lots and the
vesting of title to the lots in the intended beneficiaries continued to
present problems to the court.71 However, in State v. Cutler72 the court
decided that, regardless of the precise legal effect of the reservations, by
the Act of Separation Maine had succeeded to all of the sovereignty of
Massachusetts with respect to the public lots, and that Maine was en
titled to assume complete custody and control of public lots reserved in
grants from Massachusetts.73 The court warned that the decision was
not to be construed to make Maine the absolute proprietor of the public
lots “and so authorized to defeat the terms of the grant by Massachusetts;
but to maintain [the public lots] for the security of those who may be en
titled to the benefit.” 74 The rationale for the decision remained the same
as in Shapleigh v. Pilsbury in that the court emphasized the rights of the
state of Maine over the lots were better than “mere strangers or trespass
ers” 75 and the state was capable of taking possession and preserving “the
property for the benefit of its citizens, for those charitable purposes in
tended.” 76 The court noted that the state was not to be favored where
70 Ch. 510, Pub. Laws of 1831. The grantors remain subject to the reservation,
however, and to the objection to set off the public lots, whether or not the state
assumes that responsibility. Mace v. Ship Pond Land & Lumber Co., 112 Me. 420,
422-23, 92 A. 486 (1914).
71 In 1830 the court speculated that perhaps the fee simple title in grants by
Massachusetts remained in Massachusetts. Porter v. Griswold, 6 Me. 430, 435
(1830).
72 16 Me. 349 (1839).
73 Pursuant to the provisions of ch. 510, §§7, 9, Pub. Laws o f 1831.
74 16 Me. at 351.

73 Id.
76 Id. at 352.
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its interest was merely a “despotic interference” but only where it acted
to preserve the property for future beneficiaries.
In 1849, in Dillingham v. Smith,77 the court was again faced with an
issue involving the legal effect of the reservations of the public lots. It
did not hold, but strongly suggested that with respect to public lots re
served by Massachusetts, fee simple title to the lots remained in Massa
chusetts and passed to Maine upon separation. It did hold, however,
that with respect to lots reserved from grants by Maine, Maine reserved
legal title by virtue of having excepted the lots from the conveyances and
“constituted itself a trustee” of the public lots by the Act of 1824, by
which Maine resolved to reserve from each township 1000 acres for
public uses. The court also noted that the reservation of the public lots
was not an “appropriation” of the public lots but that the public lots
were, in the language of the Act,78 “to be appropriated” and that the
“expected town or corporation can acquire no title to any definite num
ber of acres for any particular use, except by virtue of such appropria
tion.” 79
As a result of the decision in Dillingham v. Smith, Maine appears to
have had legal title to all lots which were reserved from its own convey
ances, and may have had legal title to public lots reserved from pre-1820
conveyances by Massachusetts. Clearly, it had custody and control
over substantially all of the public lots. In 1852, the court held that no
private person could object to the absence of Massachusetts in court
proceedings to locate a public lot in a township granted by Maine
and Massachusetts jointly,80 thus making Maine’s custody, as against
objection by all but perhaps Massachusetts itself, complete and exclu
sive. Finally, in 1853, Massachusetts deeded to Maine all of the public
lots in which it had an interest.8182The deed recited that the conveyance
was subject to obligations imposed by the Articles of Separation. Other
than this reference to the Articles of Separation, however, the deed it
self imposed no new or additional restrictions. As a result of the deed,
Maine appears to have had legal title to all public lots, including those
reserved by Massachusetts, by Maine, and by the two states jointly.
In 1883, in Union Parish Society v. Upton,82 the Maine court de
fined the nature of the powers held by the state over the public lots. The
immediate issue before the court was whether the Act of 1832,83 divert77 3 0 Me. 370 (1849).
78 Ch. 393, Pub. Laws of 1828, containing substantially identical provisions for
the reservation of public lots as were contained in ch. 280, §8, Pub. Laws o f 1824.
79 30 Me. at 378.
80 Hammond v. Morrell, 33 Me. 300 (1851).
81 M e . H. D oc. No. 12 (1854).
82 74 Me. 545 (1883).
83 Ch. 39, Pub. Laws of 1832.
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ing ministerial lands to school purposes, interfered with vested rights
and was, therefore, an unconstitutional impairment of a contractual right
or obligation.84 Plaintiffs were organized in 1879 in the town of Upton
which was incorporated in 1860 in a township conveyed by Massachu
setts in 1804 pursuant to the Resolve of 17 8 8,85 which required a reser
vation of public lots for ministerial and school purposes. The timber and
grass had been sold by the town and the proceeds disbursed exclusively
to the schools. The plaintiffs sought to recover a share of the proceeds for
ministerial purposes.
The court held first that the 1788 Massachusetts resolve conveyed
no land but merely established the policy to except certain lots from con veyances when conveyances were made. The court then held:86
The deed did not, ipso facto, create an appropriation of land for ministeri
al purposes. It merely reserved to the grantors [i.e., Massachusetts and,
later, Maine] the right and means of creating a trust according to thendeclared public policy, should opportunity offer. By means o f the excep
tion, something was to be or might in the future be appropriated. It was a
prospective provision for a gift, but not a gift per se . . . . If not for legal
reasons, certainly for great moral and political considerations, the state
of Maine has ever been willing to effectuate the designs and policy of the
parent commonwealth in relation to all of the lands reserved or appropri
ated by her for public use within the limits of this state,— modifying the
original plan in such respects only as the growth o f society and the needs
and the sentiments of the community would seem to demand and make
reasonable.

The court did not expressly purport to construe the Articles of Separa
tion. Nevertheless, the Articles of Separation clearly recite that the public
lots were required to be reserved “for the benefit of Schools, and of the
Ministry.” 87 While the Union Parish Society had no vested rights what
soever by virtue of the reservation, the question remained whether Maine
had any specific obligation to use the public lots in any particular fash
ion. In other words, the court did not answer the question whether Maine
was required to cause some interest in the public lots to vest in any par
ticular class of beneficiaries or to use the public lots for a particular
public purpose. Instead, the court merely noted Maine’s willingness (for
whatever reasons) to effectuate an unspecified design and policy of its
parent commonwealth, modifying the plan in ways which the “growth of

84 The plaintiffs relied upon Yarmouth v. North Yarmouth, 34 Me. 411 (1852)
and the principles established in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518 (1819). See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
85 Ch. 80, [1787-88] Resolves of Massachusetts.
88 74 Me. at 548.

87 M e . Const, art. X, §5.
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society and the needs and the sentiments of the community would seem
to demand and make reasonable.”88
In 1903, in State v. Mullen89 the court again discussed the powers of
the state over the public lots. The court noted that Maine had generally
pursued the policy of making reservations of land for public uses, and
that until incorporation the reserved lands and the funds from them
are under the general control of the state90 with no limitations upon its
power to designate the uses or to control the title vested in the benefi
ciaries, only that they are to be public and for the benefit of the town.91
The court then held that the state “according as it reserved to itself . . .
the power to direct, has directed that the use for which reserved lands
are to be held is the support of schools, and this use follows the proceeds
of the sales of the lands themselves.” 92 Therefore, within the category
of schools, the state enjoyed a wide discretion and could appropriate
funds arising from the reserved lots to a particular school, to a particular
grade of schools, or to the schools in a particular part of a town or plan
tation. “The only limitations expressed are that the use be public and
for the benefit of the town.” 93 As in Upton, the court in Mullen did not
expressly construe the Articles of Separation.
The language of the court in Upton and Mullen and the fact that
Maine did not seek the consent of Massachusetts in 182494 when it
began to reserve a single lot of 1000 acres for “public uses” (rather than
four lots of 320 acres each for ministerial and school purposes) indicate
that the requirements of the Articles of Separation were not literally
construed by either the court or the legislature during the early history
of the state.95 More specifically, it appears that the state, to a large ex
tent, assumed the power to deal with the public lots as it saw fit. It
followed logically that if the state enjoyed the powers it already had
exercised in changing the particular public use which it made of the public
lots, it could change the class of beneficiaries as well. Indeed, the limits
88 74 Me. at 548.
89 97 Me. 331, 54 A. 841 (1903).
90 Citing Dudley v. Greene, 35 Me. 14 (1852).
91 97 Me. at 335, 54 A. at 843. The limitations that the uses be public and for
the benefit of the town are characterized as having been imposed upon Maine by
Maine itself.
92 97 Me. at 337, 54 A. at 844.
Mid.

94 Ch. 280, §8, Pub. Laws of 1824.
95 In addition, bits and pieces of the public lots have from time to time been sold
or used for public uses other than the ministry or schools. The public lots in
Baxter State Park, for example, are expressly held by the state under the terms
and conditions applicable to the surrounding lands granted to the state by Governor
Baxter. M e . R ev. Stat. A nn . tit. 12, §902 (1974).

235

MAINE LAW REVIEW

of the state’s power with respect to these lands seem to have been almost
nonexistent.
There remained, however, a serious obstacle to the logical extension
of the reasoning of the court in Upton and in Mullen. In neither case did
the court directly construe the Articles of Separation. For example,
neither Upton nor any other case holds that Maine has no obligation to
effectuate the designs and policy of the parent commonwealth” in rela
tion to the public lots. Nor has any case elaborated upon what the
“designs and policy of the parent commonwealth” are, regardless of
whether the obligation is legal, moral or political. Finally, no case has
held that the public lots are or could be treated merely as another part
of the public domain.
The requirement in the Articles of Separation that the public lots
be reserved from conveyances of townships seems inherently incom
patible with the notion that the Articles of Separation contemplated
no difference in the posture of the sovereign toward the public lots as
opposed to the public domain. Had Maine delivered two deeds to each
township, one conveying the township less the public lot and one con
veying the public lot, and placed the proceeds from both conveyances
in the general treasury, common sense dictates that the spirit, if not
the letter, of the Articles of Separation would have been violated. If
this circumvention was violative of the Articles of Separation in 1821,
it would seem no less violative in 1883, when Upton was decided, or to
day. Moreover, many cases, including Cutler and Mullen, referred to the
state as a trustee of the public lots and not as merely the proprietor of
the lots.96 In addition, the purposes for which the lots were reserved
have been referred to as “charitable” by the Supreme Judicial Court.97
The rationale for the Cutler decision was that instead of a “despotic”
interference by the state, this was an action by the state for the “preser
vation of property” 98 and “for the protection and preservation of what
ever of value there may be growing thereon.” 99 This characterization
is not generally used in referring to portions of the public domain like
the beds of tidal waters and great ponds.100
Further, the court zealously protected public lots when they were in the
hands of private persons, charging the custodians with fiduciary obliga96 Maine has been so characterized with respect to public lots reserved in grants
by Massachusetts, Maine, and by both jointly.
97 State v. Cutler, 16 Me. 349, 352 (1839).
98 Id. at 351.
" D u d ley v. Greene, 35 Me. 14, 16 (1852).
100See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 118 Me. 503, 106 A. 865 (1 9 2 0 ), holding
that the beds o f the great ponds, like other property owned by people, may be
transferred by the legislature unless prohibited by the Maine Constitution.
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tions and effectively preventing a transfer of the fee by the custodians.101
Nothing said by the court precludes the tempting analogy that the
obligations imposed by Massachusetts upon private persons are identical
in source, purpose, and wording to the obligations imposed by the
Articles of Separation upon Maine. No doubt differences exist between
the sovereign and private persons, but the legal distinction usually re
lates more to such practical problems as enforcement of the trust102 rather
than whether in principle a trust was created and fiduciary obligations
assumed.
Finally, in several early cases, parties argued that the state could not
sell public lots but is required by the Articles of Separation to retain
and protect them until the coming into existence of the intended bene
ficiaries.103 Though the court did not accept the argument, neither did
it expressly reject it, managing to dispose of the cases on other grounds.
So long as specific charitable purposes were contemplated, the dis
tinction between the “public uses” for which the public lots were re
served, and any use by the government for nonprivate purposes may
have been clear. This is particularly true where Massachusetts, and then
Maine, sold land in huge quantities merely to raise sufficient revenue to
pay old debts and run the daily operations of the government. The distinc
tion fades completely, however, where no specific charitable or public
purposes are required because the expression “charitable purposes,”
like the expression “public purposes,” seems incapable of precise defini
tion.104 If the public lots were sold and the proceeds used to maintain
the highways of the state for a few years or to erect housing for the dis
advantaged, wouldn’t the public lots have been used for a “public
purpose” or a “charitable purpose”? Isn’t any expenditure of funds by
the state constitutionally required to be for the benefit of the “public”?105
Prior to the Opinion of the Justices,106 in response to questions about
L.D. 1812,107 the court had never attempted to analyze and resolve the
inconsistency between the language of its decisions and acts of the
legislature, on the one hand, and the plain wording of the Articles of
Separation on the other. The Opinion responded to a series of five ques101 See, e.g., Shapleigh v. Pilsbury, 1 Me. 271 (1821); Flye v. First Congrega
tional Church, 114 Me. 158, 95 A. 783 (1915).
102 See 2 A. Scott, T he L aw of T rusts §95 (3d ed. 1967) and 4 Id. §378 to
the effect that charitable trusts cannot be enforced against the state except to the
extent that the state consents to be sued.
103See, e.g., Dudley v. Greene, 35 Me. 14 (1852); Walker v. Lincoln, 45 Me.
67 (1858); Argyle v. Dwinal, 29 Me. 29 (1848).
104 4 A. Scott, T he Law of T rusts, §368 (3d ed. 1967).
105 See M e . Const., art. IV, pt. 3, §1.
106 3 08 A .2d 253 (Me. 1973).
107 See note 65 supra, and accompanying text.
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tions inquiring whether the specific portions of L.D. 1812 violated the
Articles of Separation, the distribution of power provisions108 or the
due process clauses of the federal or state constitutions. Each question
was followed by an alternative question whether, if a particular section
of L.D. 1812 violated the Articles of Separation, the bill would be con
stitutional upon the consent of the legislature of Massachusetts.
The Opinion concluded that L.D. 1812 violated none of the cited
constitutional provisions. The court stated that the Articles of Separation
required the public lots to be reserved but that no vested rights were
created by those reservations. It also said that by being required to
reserve the public lots, and by reserving them, the state has “effectively
subjected itself to a legal restriction; it has removed the ‘public lots’ from
its dominion as an absolute proprietor and has denied itself ‘an authority
to convey the premises to any other person or corporation, or for any
other uses’. . .
109 The court went on to conclude that the reservation
“contemplated” by article X of the Constitution of Maine is that the
lands reserved from the public domain must continue to be held and
preserved by the state for the “beneficial uses” 110 intended.
Having concluded that the public lots were subject to a special set of
rules and could not be treated like public domain, the court then focused
upon whether the uses proposed by L.D. 1812 were proper. The essence
of the Opinion is the court’s statement that the reference in the Articles
of Separation to schools and to the ministry are not intended to be ex
clusive limitations, but “merely illustrative of a more comprehensive
assemblage of beneficial purposes ‘usual’ in ‘reservations’ made by
Massachusetts prior to separation. . . .” 111 The court noted that in addi
tion to local schools and the ministry, Massachusetts reserved lands for
Harvard College and, of course, for “the further appropriation of the
General Court.” On the basis that the uses specified in the Articles of
Separation are not exclusive but are illustrative of a broader field of
beneficial purposes, the court found that the uses of the public lots con
templated by L.D. 1812 were within the group of beneficial purposes.
The court did not define the limits of power of the state over these
lands, but it was quite clear in its requirement that the lands be preserved
108 U.S. Const, art. I, §1; M e . C onst, art. Ill, §§ 1,2. The applicability of these
constitutional provisions rests upon the doctrine that only the judicial branch
of the government may alter or construe the provisions of any charitable trust.
See Bridgeport Pub. Library v. Burroughs Home, 85 Conn. 309, 82 A. 582 (1912).
See also 4 A. Scott, T he L aw of T rusts, §381, n.16 (3d ed. 1967).
308 A .2d at 269, quoting Shapleigh v. Pilsbury, 1 Me. 271, 288-89 (1821).
110 308 A .2d at 270. The court reiterated in several instances that the public
lots are not in the public domain, over which the state has absolute proprietorship,
but rather must be held and preserved for the public uses intended. Id. at 271.
111 Id. at 270.
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and not sold. Yet sales and exchanges of land were to have been per
mitted by L.D. 1812 for the purchase of other contiguous lands to bemanaged as public lots. The rules imposed by the Articles of Separation
are directed, therefore, not merely to sale of a public lot but to the pur
pose for which the sale is made and the use to which the proceeds are
put. It seems clear that the lands may not be sold and proceeds placed
in the general treasury of the state, though such a use of the lands, or
their proceeds, would clearly be a “public use” of the lands.
For what specific purposes, then may the lands be used? By answering
the way it did, the court appears to have reserved to itself the power
to determine what uses fall within the “assemblage of beneficial purposes”
which fall within the spirit of uses made by Massachusetts prior to separa
tion. In other words, though the court held that there is no violation of
the separation of powers doctrine, neither did it yield to the legislative
branch of the government a free hand over the manner in which these
lands are to be used.
Other courts have defined the power of a legislative body over the
terms of charitable trusts112 and school lands subject to constitutional
restraints.113 The public lots are not a charitable trust in the ordinary
sense of the word, however, because there is no beneficiary interposed
between the trustee and the corpus. A host of considerations and rules,
therefore, simply do not apply. In addition, the public lots are unlike
school lands reserved under a number of state constitutions,114 pri
marily because most such school lands are similar to charitable trusts.
The schools, or those who have a litigable interest in protecting funds
dedicated for schools, have been interposed as beneficiaries.115 Moreover,
the provisions of most state constitutions116 are far more elaborate about
112 Bridgeport Pub. Library v. Burroughs Home, 85 Conn. 309, 82 A . 582
(1912); Stanley v. Colt, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 119 (1866); Old So. Soc’y v. Crocker,
119 Mass 1 (1875); Jones v. Vermont Asbestos Corp. 108 Vt. 79, 182 A . 291
(1936).
113 Cooper v. Roberts, 59 U.S. (18 How) 173 (1855); Alabama v. Schmidt,
232 U.S. 168 (1914); Lassen v. Arizona ex. rel. Arizona Highway D ep’t, 385 U.S.
458 (1967); United States v. 111.2 Acres of Land in Ferry County, Washington,
293 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Wash. 1960), aff'd 435 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1970). At
least one court has referred to the power o f the legislature to divert the use of
school lands as the power o f legislative cy pres. Daniel v. Sones, 245 Miss. 461,
147 So.2d 626 (1962).
n i See, e.g., N ev. C onst, art. XI, §3; T ex. Const, art. VII, §2, U tah C onst.
art. X, §2.
115 See, e.g., Lassen v. Arizona ex. rel. Arizona Highway Dep’t 385 U.S. 458
(1967)
116 See, e.g., N ev. C onst, art. XI, §5.
All lands, including the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections in any
township donated for the benefit of public schools in the act of the Thirtyeighth Congress, to enable the people of Nevada Territory to form a
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the manner and purposes for the administration and use of school lands
than are the Articles of Separation.
The rules which apply to such other school lands (and to charitable
trusts) seem to have greater applicability to the public lots which are
in towns in Maine, and which have become vested in the inhabitants of
those towns, than to the public lots controlled by the state. The inhabi
tants of the towns appear to have a constitutionally protected vested
right in their public lots.117 Although the right to alter or annul powers
with respect to those lands was expressly reserved by the legislature, the
only instance in which the state made a significant alteration of rights
with respect to public lots in towns included the consent of the inhabi
tants of the towns.118
With respect to the public lots in the unincorporated areas of the
state, however, the limitation of the power of the legislature derives
not from private or vested rights, but from different sources. There exist
limitations upon the exercise of legislative power over public resources
embodied in what has been called the “Public Trust Doctrine.” 119 This
doctrine holds that certain public resources, such as wetlands or parklands, are generally required to be used for those broadly based public
uses to which the particular resources are adapted, such as navigation or
recreation, and that this requirement can be a limitation upon even
legislative power over these resources. While the limits of state power
with respect to public resources subject to the public trust doctrine have
not been clearly defined,120 it is clear that courts have been willing to
review the disposition or the purported authorization for alternative uses
of public trust lands to determine whether the proposed disposition is
compatible with the public interest.121
state government . . . and all proceeds of lands that have been or may
hereafter be granted or appropriated by the United States to this state,. . .
and all proceeds derived from any or all of said sources shall be pledged
for educational purposes, and shall not be transferred to any other funds
for other u ses.. . .
117See Yarmouth v. North Yarmouth, 34 Me. 411 (1852).
118 Ch. 254, §7, Pub. Laws of 1824 reserved the right to restrain or annul powers
granted by the act to trustees of public lots in towns. Notwithstanding this reser
vation, the consent was obtained in order to divert to school purposes the ministerial
lots in Maine towns incorporated by Massachusetts, ch. 47, [1831] Laws of
Massachusetts; ch. 492, Pub. Laws of 1831. It seems debatable that the consent
of the inhabitants of towns incorporated by Maine after 1824 would be required
to alter the purposes for which the public lots in such municipalities are used. Cf.
ch. 628, §4-A, Pub. Laws of 1973.
119 See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 M ich . L. R ev. 471 (1970).
12» Id. at 486.
121 The landmark case in public trust law is Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387 (1892). See also Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 350 Mass.
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There are, however, conceptual problems with almost any effort to
define concisely the limits of the public trust doctrine and the role the
courts play in reviewing legislative action falling within the purview of
that doctrine. The exercise in legal definition is probably much less im
portant than the fact that limitations do exist and that judicial review
of specific legislative action in this area is available.
Whether or not the public lots are nominally to be considered subject
to the public trust doctrine, it seems clear that legislative and administra
tive action with respect to the public lots will be subject to the same kind
of scrutiny and review by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine as courts
of other jurisdictions have given to public resources subject to the public
trust doctrine. This is not likely to result in a substantive bar to most
legislative action with respect to the public lots. It has introduced, how
ever, in the form of judicial review, a procedural device which did not
exist before. Judicial review may insure that this great public asset is
used by the state for the greatest possible public benefit in a manner
which is as enlightened as the full resources of our government can
provide.
C. The State and the Proprietors of the Townships
1. Located Public Lots
At the outset, it should be noted that no title to the townships could be
conveyed which would deprive the state of its right to set apart and locate
the public lots.122 Under the express provisions of substantially all deeds
from the state and pursuant to express statutory authority,123 the public
lots are to average in situation, quality, and value as to timber and
minerals the other lands in the town. The words “timber and minerals”
modify the word “value” and do not modify the words “quality” or
“situation.” 124125 “[Qjuality includes not only the soil, but the kind and
amount of the growth upon it, and situation includes proximity to float
able streams and accessibility for operation or settlement upon it.” 123
Once public lots have been duly located, the state is the owner in
fee simple, including all rights therein and appurtenances thereto,126 less
410, 215 N.E. 2d 14 (1966). The power of the courts to determine the “public
interest” is, perhaps, not as startling as it may seem. The power of the judiciary
over the legislature with respect to the corpus of the public trust is analogous to the
power of the chancellor over the trustee of a charitable trust.
122 See Argyle v. Dwinal, 29 Me. 29 (1848).

122 M e . R ev. S tat. A nn. tit. 30, §4151 (Supp. 1973).
124 The deeds themselves do not mention timber or minerals, only “quality” and
“situation.” Moreover, minerals are ordinarily measured in terms of value, not
in terms of situation or quality.
125 Stetson v. Grant, 102 Me. 222, 227, 66 A. 480, 482 (1906).
126 The capacity in which the state holds the public lots and its powers with re
spect thereto are discussed beginning at p. 230, supra.
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anything lawfully and actually conveyed away by the state.127 With the
sole exception of any conveyed rights and interests, it is fair to assume
that the state has at least the same rights and privileges in the public lots
as a private person would have in a similar quantity of land which he
owned, including the exclusive right of possession and use, and the ex
clusive right to receive income and profits. In those instances where
located public lots are totally surrounded by private property, the state
presumably has the power to acquire full rights of ingress and egress
by the exercise of its power of eminent domain.128
2.

Unlocated Public Lots
Where public lots have not been located, the state is a tenant in
common with the other persons or entities owning the remainder of the
township.129 In other words, the state has a common and undivided in
terest in all townships in which the public lots have not yet been located.130
With the exception of express agreements to the contrary or rights and
interests which it has conveyed,131 the state as a tenant in common enjoys
rights normally enjoyed by all tenants in common in real property in
cluding the right (1 ) to enter upon the common property and take
possession of the whole thereof, subject to the equal and similar rights
of the other cotenants;132 (2 ) to share in all rents and profits attributable

127 This includes the right to cut and carry away the timber and grass, discussed
infra pp. 243-61. In addition, the Forest Commissioner has the power, under certain
circumstances, to sell gravel and mining rights, to lease or grant campsite privileges,
flowage rights and other easements, profits and possessory rights in the public
lots. M e . R ev. Stat. A nn . tit. 12, §514 (1974).
128 Cases discussing the fact that the state owns and manages the public lots in a
sovereign and governmental capacity, and not in a proprietary capacity, are dis
cussed at pp. 232-37 supra.
129Donworth v. Sawyer, 94 Me. 242, 47 A. 521 (1900); Hammond v. Morrell,
33 Me. 300, (1851); Mace v. Ship Pond Land & Lumber Co., 112 Me. 420, 92 A.
486 (1914).
130 According to State F orestry D ep ’t , R eport on the P ublic R eserved
L ots (1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963 R eport], there were 160,286 acres of un
located public lots, giving to the state a relatively small common and undivided
interest in several million acres.

131 For practical purposes, the timber and grass rights are the major rights or
interests in unlocated public lots which the state has heretofore conveyed.
132 Carter v. Bailey, 64 Me. 458, 464-65 (1874); See also Morrison v. Clark, 89
Me. 103, 35 A. 1034 (1896); Hudson v. Coe, 79 Me. 83, 8 A. 249 (1887);
Witham v. Witham, 57 Me. 447 (1868). It seems appropriate to suggest that
there may be limitations upon the state’s power, as a tenant in common, to the
extent of approximately a 1/23 interest, to exercise its possessory rights by allowing
all citizens of the state to enter the property. Such an effort would be tantamount
to converting the remaining 22/23 interest in the township from private to public
property. Moreover, regardless o f where the legal limits are, the problem seems
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to the common property;133 and (3 ) the right to prevent waste of the
common property by cotenants.134 In Maine, a statute provides that if
one or more joint tenants or tenants in common take rents or income
in the joint estate or more than their proportional share, the other cotenants may, after demand and refusal to pay, bring an action against
the refusing cotenant.135 The sources of income in the unorganized terri
tory of Maine giving rise to a potential claim for a proportional share
by all cotenants are, of course, limitless in number, but they clearly in
clude income from minerals, timber, overnight camping rentals, camp
site leases and other surface rentals, taking sap from sugar maple trees,
commercial harvesting of wild crops, and hunting leases.
There is a substantial body of law governing the rights, duties, and
liabilities among cotenants. There is no persuasive reason why the
state may not assert all rights which it enjoys under this body of law.
The state’s cotenants are entitled to appropriate credits and contribution
where expenses have been incurred protecting the common property and
where common liabilities have been discharged. In determining whether
obligations discharged are common obligations and whether expenses
for the benefit of the common property have been incurred solely by
the state’s cotenants, however, the posture of the state ought to be con
siderably more advantageous than that of private individuals because
the state directly or indirectly pays or underwrites the payment for
expenses for the benefit of the millions of acres in which it is a tenant in
common.
II.

T h e T im b e r a n d G r a ss R ig h ts

A.

What Was Conveyed?
Various positions are taken by the courts in defining the legal con
sequences which result from a conveyance of timber growing on land.
In general, such deeds or contracts convey (1 ) a fee simple absolute
in the timber; (2 ) an estate or interest in the timber determinable with
respect to timber not removed within an express or implied time limit,
often characterized as a fee simple defeasible; (3 ) a profit a prendre; or
hypothetical because any such effort by the state would likely lead to the loca
tion or partition of the remaining unlocated lots. Possessory rights by agents of
the state which do not impose such a burden upon the other co-tenants, however,
seem clearly to belong to the state.
133 Hudson v. Coe, 79 Me. 83, 8 A. 249 (1887).
134 See Maxwell v. Maxwell, 31 Me. 184 (1850). M e . R ev. Stat. A nn . tit. 14,
§7505 (1964), prohibits waste without advance notice and provides a statutory
action to recover treble damages under certain conditions.
135 M e . R ev. Stat. A nn . tit. 33, §953 (1964).
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(4 ) a mere revocable license.136 Because the timber and grass deeds
delivered pursuant to Chapter 196 of the Public Laws of 1850 covering
the public lots were delivered under seal, used traditional words of real
estate conveyancing,137* and were given in exchange for a specific con
sideration paid or to be paid upon delivery of the deed (and not de
pendent upon the quantity of timber to be cut), there can be no
reasonable doubt that the timber and grass deeds conveyed an interest
in the real property to which the timber and grass was attached rather
than a mere revocable license to enter upon the land and cut timber.136
The “conveyance of growing trees to remain alive upon the land and
to be cut in the future, is a conveyance of an interest in land, that may
nourish and support the growth conveyed. The trees become chattels
only when severed from the soil.” 139
The conveyance of a “right” to take any substance which can be
severed from the freehold is the language typically used in the creation
of a profit a prendre.140 A profit a prendre is a right or power to acquire,
by severance or removal from another’s land, something previously
constituting a part of the land.141 While it is an estate in real property
for purposes of the Statute of Frauds, no title to the subject of the profit
actually passes to the grantee; instead, the grantee has only a right which
gives him title to the subject of the profit after its severance and when
it becomes personalty.
While Maine recognizes profits a prendre, and some cases have even
mentioned that the right to cut wood142 and grass143 may be the subject of
a profit a pendre, no Maine case has ever held any form of conveyance
of timber rights to be a profit a prendre. There are some distinctions
between the deeds. Profits a prendre normally do not convey the ex
clusive right to take the subject of the profit unless there is clear and
explicit language in the grant to that effect.144 In the usual case, the

ty

136 See 1 G. T hompson, C ommentaries on the M odern L aw
§101 (1964) [hereinafter cited as T hompson],

of

R eal P roper

137 Also included was an habendum clause referring to heirs, executors, adminis
trators, and assigns.
’3« Brown v. Bishop, 105 Me. 272, 277, 74 A. 724, 727 (1 909), holds that
the words “to cut” impute the same rights as “to cut as one’s own” or “to have.”
139Donworth v. Sawyer, 94 Me. 242, 254, 47 A. 521, 524 (1900). The interest
is the same whether created by grant, reservation or exception in a deed, and the
interest is assignable. Id. at 255, 257, 47 A. 524-25.
140 1 T hompson §135. The most recent and leading case on profits a prendre
in Maine, however, involved a deed “reserving the gravel,” and this was held to
have created a profit. Beckworth v. Ross, 157 Me. 532, 175 A.2d 732 (1961).

1411 T hompson §135.
142 Duncan v. Sylvester, 24 Me. 482, 487 (1844).
443 Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83, 100 (1861).
144 3 H. T iffany, T he L aw of R eal P roperty §846 (3d ed. 1939).
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owner of the servient estate may partake of the subject of the profit and
may convey to others a similar right to partake of the profit. At least
one case rests squarely upon the assumption, however, that the timber
and grass deeds convey all of the cutting rights and that subsequent
grantees receive nothing.145 Further, the fact that the consideration re
ceived was a single cash payment rather than some form of royalty is
an indication that title to the timber, and not merely a profit a prendre,146
was intended to pass. In Small v. Small,1*7 the court held that “valid
title to the timber” passed to the grantee of a timber and grass deed, and
in other cases the court has referred to the timber and grass deeds as
having sold the timber.148149 The Maine cases seem firmly grounded on
the proposition that the interest of the grantee in a timber and grass
deed is a fee simple determinable.148 More significantly, the cases have
not used, much less emphasized, labels in construing the conveyance of
cutting rights, but have taken a more functional approach.150
The essential distinction between the conveyance of timber in fee
simple absolute and fee simple defeasible is that the latter interest con
templates a cessation of cutting rights. The fee simple interest in the
timber not removed prior to the expiration of the cutting rights is, by
a legal fiction, deemed to revest in the grantor. A fee simple absolute
in timber, on the other hand, does not contemplate a cessation of cutting
rights. There can be a fee simple absolute in one growth of timber, which
gives the grantee a perpetual right to remove timber which was in
existence at the time of the conveyance.151 There can also be a fee
simple absolute in successive growths of timber that gives the grantee a
perpetual right to remove all timber whether in existence at the time
of the conveyance or grown thereafter.152
As with other kinds of deeds, the focal point for interpretation of a
timber deed is the expressed intention of the parties gathered from all
parts of the instrument, giving each word its due force and read in light
of existing conditions and circumstances.153 Within the framework, the
interest conveyed to the grantee under a timber deed depends upon what
timber may be cut under the grant and when the right to cut the timber
145 Walker v. Lincoln, 45 Me. 67 (1858).
140 See Hahner, An Analysis of Profits a Prendre, 25 O re. L. .Rev. 217, 225
(1946).
147 35 Me. 400 (1853).
148 Walker v. Lincoln, 45 Me. 67 (1858).
149 Cf. Brown v. Bishop, 105 Me. 272, 74 A. 724 (1909); Small v. Small, 35
Me. 400 (1853); H. F alk, T imber and F orest Products Law §68 (1 958).
150 penley v. Emmons, 117 Me. 108, 110, 102 A. 972, 973 (1918).
151 Cf. Brass v. Peyton, 450 P.2d 760, 252 Ore. 482 (1969).
152 See 1 T hompson §101.
153 Penley v. Emmons, 117 Me. 108, 110, 102 A. 972, 973 (1918).
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expires.154 The appropriate questions are whether the timber which is
conveyed (or which may be cut) is limited as to a certain size, class
or species or includes an entire growth or even successive growths, and
whether the timber conveyed must be removed within a definite period
of time or whether there is a perpetual right of removal.
In Donworth v. Sawyer,155 the timber deed in controversy was an 1850
conveyance by Massachusetts of “all the pine and spruce timber standing
on said Township . . . to be taken off from time to time to suit [the
grantee’s] convenience.” The deed further recited that it was not to
retard the settlement of the township and that lots on the township sold
for settlement by Massachusetts were to be cleared the next lumbering
season or as soon as practicable. The proprietors of the township sued
the timber grantees in trover for the value of pine and spruce timber cut
in 1897 and 1898. They argued that the deed had conveyed only pine
and spruce timber standing on the township at the date of the deed, and
that it did not pass title to any trees that should thereafter become
timber. The plaintiffs urged that “timber,” as it was commonly under
stood at the time of the delivery of the timber deed, meant timber of a
certain size at the time of the conveyance, and that it did not include trees
which were either nonexistent or saplings at the date of the deed but
which subsequently grew into the size of “timber.” The defendant
argued that pine and spruce “timber” meant pine and spruce “growth”
and that the deed therefore conveyed the right to remove trees which
were not of timber size at the time of the grant but which thereafter grew
to size. The defendant pointed out that the deed was “almost identical”
to the “deeds whereby the timber and grass on the public lots of this
state are conveyed.” The court found that Massachusetts’s purpose as
expressed in the deed was to foster the settlement of public domain and,
in furtherance of that purpose, it sold the pine and spruce to be removed
from the township so that the land could more easily be cleared. The
court stated that Massachusetts “wanted the forest cleared, not pre
served” and held:156
Where, as in this state, the grant o f growing trees to remain affixed to
the soil or the exception of them from the grant, is an interest in land,
it is logical to consider the trees, and the right in the soil, and the growth
of them as a unit and inseparable. Their owner is entitled to their in
crease. The grant o f trees, or timber, or particular kinds of timber trees,
should be held a grant of the growth, standing at the time of the grant.
If the grant limits itself by size of tree, age, or adaptability for specified
uses, then of course the particular described tree would pass and none
other. But where there is no limitation of that character, and the grant
154Id. at 111, 102 A. at 973.
155 94 Me. 242, 47 A. 521 (1900).
136 Id. at 256-57, 47 A. at 525.
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is of standing timber, to be taken off in the future, the common under
standing would be that the grantee might cut timber from the lot until
the present growth, suitable for the purpose, shall have been exhausted,
or until the right to cut shall have expired by limitation, either express
or implied.
That must have been the purpose of the grant in question. Massachusetts
said to the grantees, for a valuable consideration, you may “log” for
pine and spruce on the township at your pleasure, but fast enough to
clear the land for settlers as they may come.

The court concluded that while the defendants owned the entire growth
in existence at the time of the conveyance, they did not own subsequent
growths. The plaintiffs were therefore entitled to recover the value of
“any pine and spruce so cut that were not standing at the time of the con
veyance . . . in 1850.” 157
The court in Donworth not only examined the intent of Massachusetts
in making the grant, but held that “the word ‘timber’ should be given
the meaning suited to the purposes of the grant apparent from the whole
deed.” 158 It noted that the word “timber” may mean that wood which,
at the time of the grant, was of a type suitable for building houses or
ships or was capable of being squared and cut into beams, rafters, planks
and boards. The deed in Donworth was held to have conveyed but a
single growth of timber. Thus, the rule enunciated there is that a timber
grantee to whom a single entire growth has been conveyed can continue
to cut until the growth conveyed is exhausted or until the right to cut
has expired.159
157 Id. at 257, 47 A. at 525.
158 Id. at 252, 47 A. at 523. Shortly after Donworth was decided, the state
brought suit to determine whether “beech, maple, birch and other trees, not suitable
for any purpose but for fire-wood [arel to be regarded as ‘timber’ within the
meaning of chapter 196 o f the laws of 1850.” State v. Mullen, 97 Me. 331, 54
A 841 (1903). In its decision dated February 24, 1903, the court disposed of the
case on other grounds. On March 28, 1903, the legislature enacted “An Act to make
certain the meaning o f the language ‘Timber and Grass’ as it relates to the public
lots,” and defined “timber and grass” as “all growth of every description on said
lots.” Ch. 232, Pub. Laws o f 1903. The meaning of the word “timber” and the
effect of the repeal of the 1903 legislation is one issue in pending litigation. Cushing
v. Lund, Kennebec Super. Ct. Doc. No. 1740-73 (filed May 16, 1973).
The general rule in the lumber industry is that “timber” denotes trees o f a size
suitable for manufacture into lumber for building and related purposes, and does
not include saplings, brush, fruit trees or trees suitable only for firewood and
decorations. An instructive discussion of the term is contained in M. & I. Timber
Co. v. Hope Silver-Lead Mines, Inc., 91 Idaho 638, 428 P.2d 955 (1967). See also
Nash v. Drisco, 51 Me. 417 (1864) (“timber does not include firewood or cordwood”). When the legislature intended to convey more than merely “timber,” it
appears to have used particularized language. See, e.g., ch. 51, [1853] Resolves
o f Maine ( “all the timber o f whatever kind or quality”).
159 It seems clear that the cutting rights expire upon the first to occur of the
named alternatives. Otherwise, successive growths could have been cut by the
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There are obvious and fundamental similarities between the deed in
Donworth and the timber and grass deeds. A review of the distinctions
between them, however, provides a more incisive format upon which
to analyze the timber and grass deeds. The pertinent distinctions be
tween the two forms of deeds may be summarized as follows:
1. The deed in Donworth used the wording “standing” to describe
the timber conveyed, whereas the timber and grass deeds did not;
2. The deed in Donworth conveyed the “timber,” whereas the timber
and grass deeds conveyed the “right to cut and carry away the timber;”
3. The deed in Donworth conveyed “pine and spruce timber,” where
as the timber and grass deeds conveyed the “timber and grass;”
4. The intent of Massachusetts in conveying the pine and spruce
timber in Donworth was to “clear the forest” whereas Maine may have
had a different motive with respect to the timber and grass deeds;
5. The grantees of the deed in Donworth could remove timber “at
their convenience,” whereas the grantees of the timber and grass deeds
are authorized to remove the timber and grass until the incorporation,
or organization as a plantation, of the township or tract from which the
public lot was reserved. These distinctions are discussed below in the
order in which they are set forth.
The court in Donworth did not arrive at its conclusion that a single
growth, as opposed to successive growths, was conveyed by the deed in
that case because the word “standing” was used in connection with the
word “timber”. The court relied upon Putnam v. Tuttle180 for the propo
sition that the grant in Donworth was of trees standing on the land at
the date of the deed, and the deed in Putnam was not of “standing”
timber but of “all the wood and trees . . . forever.”160161 The court seems
to have adopted the position of the defendant that the word “standing”
was used in contradistinction to the word “down” and to have inquired
as to what standing timber was conveyed, i.e., timber standing at the
time of the grant or timber standing thereafter. The court held that the
grant of the trees, or timber, or particular kinds of timber trees, should
be held a grant of the growth standing at the time of the grant.162

grantees and the plaintiffs would not have recovered the value of the pine and
spruce trees cut in 1897 and 1898 which were not in existence at the time of the
conveyance in 1850. See also, Clarke v. Weaver Bros. Realty Corp., 197 La. 63,
200 So. 821 (1941).
160 76 Mass. 48 (1857).
161 Neither the timber and grass deeds nor the deed in Donworth convey any
timber “forever.”
162 94 Me. at 256, 47 A. at 525.
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In Penley v. Emmons,163 the court construed a deed that conveyed “a
certain lot or parcel of poplar, bass-wood and white birch timber, and
all of said timber” and gave the grantees “the right to enter and remove
the same at their convenience.” The court held that all that was conveyed
was the timber standing at the time of the conveyance.164 While there is
at least one instance in which, in the same Resolve,165 the word “standing”
is used to describe timber to be conveyed in a ten-year timber deed and
is not used to describe timber to be conveyed in certain timber and grass
deeds, there are also instances (including at least one in 1850) in which
Maine, and Massachusetts and Maine jointly, conveyed “timber” on
the public domain for a term of ten years without mentioning the word
“standing.” 166 There seems to have been no appreciable difference in
what was conveyed by the two forms of conveyance. While the presence
of the word “standing” in a timber deed can conceivably be of significance
(though it is not in Donworth167), its absence from the deed is apparently
of no significance in Maine in determining whether one or successive
growths are intended to be conveyed by a timber deed.
The timber and grass deeds grant the “right” to cut and carry away
the timber and grass, whereas the deed in Donworth granted the “timber”
and made no mention of a “right.” It is apparent from pertinent legis
lation that the word “right” was used frequently in authorizing timber
sales and the sale of timber and grass.168 Nevertheless no distinction has
ever been made by the courts of the state between the conveyance of
the timber and the conveyance of the “right” to cut timber.169 Both the
117 Me. 108, 102 A. 972 (1918).
164 See also Pease v. Gibson, 6 Me. 81 (1829); Webber v. Proctor, 89 Me. 404,
36 A. 631 (1896); Erskine v. Savage, 96 Me. 57, 51 A. 242 (1901). These cases
all involved timber deeds which did not use the word “standing,” and all were
limited to a single growth (or less). See also 1 T hompson §98.
165 Ch. 319, [1874] Resolves of Maine.
166 See, e.g., the deed dated January 15, 1850, 2 M aine-M assachusetts Joint
D eeds 108, and the deed dated December 27, 1870, 15 M aine R ecord of D eeds
641, on file in the Maine State Archives.
167 A lengthy deed to David Pingree, dated December 24, 1850, 5 M assachusetts
D eeds 105, on file in the Maine State Archives, is substantially identical to the
deed in D onworth, and while the expression “standing timber” is used in the con
veyance of one tract, the deed recites that with respect to numerous other tracts
conveyed “a sale o f timber on said township [or tract] is intended.”
168 In ch. 196, §2, Pub. Laws of 1850, the “right” to cut was first to be offered
to the proprietors of the balance of the township. In ch. 319, [1874] Resolves of
Maine, in the same paragraph, the legislature directed the sale of “all timber
standing on . . . ten townships . . . the right to cut, to extend [for ten years]” and
the sale of “the right to cut timber and grass on all lands reserved for public
uses . . .
169 In California, but apparently not elsewhere, the conveyance of the right to
cut, as opposed to the timber itself, may take on a significant distinction. See Crain
163
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“timber” and the “right” to cut timber were conveyed by the state for
periods of ten and fifteen years170 and both forms of conveyance ought
logically to have conveyed the same legal interest. The deed in Donworth
granted the “pine and spruce timber” and the court held that to mean a
grant of “the right of lumber from the pine and spruce. . . .” 171
While the grant of a “right” to cut timber may be of relevance in
determining whether the interest conveyed is a fee simple determinable
or a profit a prendre, it is of no relevance in determining what timber the
grantee has the right to cut and for how long the grantee has the right to
cut it.172 It is the scope and not the name of the interest conveyed which
is relevant. In M. & I. Timber Co. v. Hope Silver Lead Mines, Inc.,173
the court construed a reservation of the “right” to remove “any and all
timber” with no time limit for removal. The court held that the interest
created by the reservation was a profit a prendre but then went on to
decide what timber was subject to the profit. The court held that only
trees existing as timber at the time of the grant were subject to the profit.
It seems that what is logically and in substance conveyed in every con
veyance of growing timber is merely the right to cut and carry away the
timber,174 whether the instrument evidencing the transaction expressly
grants the “right” to cut timber or grants the timber itself.

v. Hoefling, 56 Cal. App.2d 396, 132 P.2d 852 (1942), and Buffum v. Texaco, Inc.,
241 Cal. App.2d 732, 50 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1966). But see Mailliard v. Willow
Creek Ranch Co., 273 Cal. App.2d 370, 78 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1969).
170 See, e.g., 17 M aine R ecord of D eeds 305, on file in Maine State Archives.
and Ch. 51, [1853] Resolves o f Maine.
17t 94 Me. at 253, 47 A. at 524.
172Cf. Penley v. Emmons, 117 Me. 108, 102 A. 972 (1918).
173 91 Idaho 638, 428 P.2d 955 (1967).
174 All that passes to the timber grantee is this right; he has title to this
right; but, until severed, the trees remain a part of the land, and the
estate of the grantor in the land in terms o f the totality of all his rights
therein is diminished only to the extent that this granted right o f removal
remains to be exercised. The land owner has not parted with any segment
of his estate in the land; he has merely parted with the right to appro
priate part of the land by severance, with the consequence that upon
appropriation the physical substance of his estate will be so far diminished.
The owner of the right to cut and remove the timber, the so-called tim
ber owner, on the other hand, can translate his ownership of his right
into ownership of the timber severed from the land, i.e., convert an in
terest in land to an interest in personalty; but when his cutting operations
cease, or if he fails to exercise his right within the time allowed, he loses,
not the timber but the right to acquire a property therein by severance.
Luccock, Timber Deeds— A Case for the Restatement of the Law of Property, 20
Wash. L. R ev. 199, 206-07 (1945). See also Goode, Logs and Logging— Timber
D eeds and Contracts— Interest of Grantee or Vendor, 34 Ore. L. R ev. 256 (1955).
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The conveyance of pine and spruce timber by the deed in Donworth
may be distinct but is not different in kind from the conveyance of
timber and grass by the timber and grass deeds. The court in Donworth
noted, presumably as evidence that successive growths were not in
tended by the deed in Donworth, that it “is well known that pine and
spruce lands in the region of this township do not reproduce the same
kind of growth.” 175 Of course, notwithstanding legislation purporting
to construe the timber and grass deeds passed more than fifty years
after the fact, the timber and grass deeds may also have conveyed only the
pine and spruce timber rather than all timber. In any event, of the cases
which have construed timber deeds, and particularly the duration of
timber rights in this state, none have been found which turned on the
distinction between a conveyance of all timber and a conveyance of
merely some species of timber. The other distinguishing feature between
what was conveyed by the two deeds, of course, is that the timber and
grass deeds conveyed grass rights. Even assuming that successive annual
growths of grass were intended to be conveyed, the rarity of naturally
occurring wild grass in commercial quantity in the unorganized territory
in Maine,176 in relation to the quantity and value of the timber growing
and harvested, precludes a construction of the timber and grass deeds
which emphasizes or turns on the right to cut grass.177178 It is probably
accurate to say that, with rare exception, none of the consideration paid
for the timber and grass deeds is fairly attributable to the value of wild
grasses then or now growing on the public lots. The reason the grass was
conveyed was to feed oxen and horses used to carry out the timber,176
and it seems highly unlikely that any use whatever was made of the
grasses except while timber operations were actually being conducted.
In other words, grass was only a complement to the timber rights.
Moreover, the legislature on at least one occasion authorized the sale
of the right to cut timber and grass for a period of fifteen years.179 No
doubt more than a single growth of grass was intended, but that does
not mean that more than one growth of timber was conveyed. If the
grantee had exhausted all timber on the tract in the first season and had
returned in the fifteenth season to cut that which had grown up in the
94 Me. at 253, 47 A. at 524.
Grass growing upon the improvements (cleared areas) made by any actual
settlers was expressly excluded from the conveyance.
177 M. G reenleaf , A Survey of the State of M aine 114 (1829), lists four
pages of valuable forest trees which are the natural products of Maine and notes
o f the “lesser shrubs” and “perennial and annual plants” that some “have valuable
properties, but the enumeration is hardly necessary.”
178 W ood, A H istory of L umbering in M aine, 1820-1861, U. of Maine
175
176

Studies, 2d Ser . No. 33, 43 M aine Bull, at 17, 86, 95.
179

Ch. 51, [1853] Resolves o f Maine.
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interim, it seems reasonably clear that the grantee would have had no
right to cut timber again in the fifteenth year, notwithstanding his right
to “successive growths” of grass. The timber and grass deeds, therefore,
should be construed in light of the fact that the essence of the transaction
was a timber conveyance.
The timber rights in Donworth were for most of a township, not for
a public lot, and specific reference was made in the deed to the fact that
the conveyance of timber rights was not to retard settlement of the town
ship. The court found that in making the conveyance, Massachusetts
“wanted the forest cleared, not preserved.” 180 The intent was, presum
ably, not only to clear the forest, but to keep it cleared until settlement
of the township. Nevertheless the court held that Massachusetts con
veyed but a single growth in that deed. With respect to all of the public
lots, in order “to prevent the timber and grass from destruction and
pillage” 181 the conveyance was made to effectuate the longstanding
policy of the state to manage the public lots “for the protection and
preservation of whatever of value there may be growing thereon.” 132
The predominant motivation fairly attributable to the legislature of
1850 was to promote the prompt settlement of the state. The public lots
were intended to be an endowment for schools in any town created in
the township. It hardly seems reasonable to impute to the legislature
the intent to clear the public lots of all growth upon them, or to clear
the public lots and to keep them cleared of this most valuable resource
for a prolonged period of time.
In Flye v. First Congregational Parish,1*3 the court had occasion to
construe the rights of certain parties respecting the management of a pub
lic lot reserved for ministerial purposes. In this case the lot had vested
from time to time in various ministers as they served the parish, but at
the time of the suit, no settled minister was then serving the parish and
title to the public lot was “in abeyance.” In striking down an attempted
conveyance by the parish of “all the trees standing and growing on the
lot,” the court held that although the parish was entitled to income from
the lot while no minister served the parish, if the purported conveyance
were “carried into effect the lot would be stripped, and not merely the
income or profits of the capital to which the parish is entitled, but the
capital itself would be effectively disposed of.” 184 With advance notice of
iso 9 4 Me. at 253, 47 A. at 524.
Walker v. Lincoln, 45 Me. 67, 70 (1858).
182 Dudley v. Greene, 35 Me. 14, 16 (1852).
183 114 Me. 158, 95 A. 783 (1915).
184 Id. at 166, 95 A. at 786. See also Dunn v. Burleigh, 62 Me. 24, 36 (1873),
where the court declined to indulge in the presumption that the legislature intended
that land meant to benefit settlers be placed in a position where it might be
stripped of timber.
181
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imminent organization or incorporation of a township, it is not only feasi
ble but in the direct pecuniary interest of the owners of timber and grass
rights to strip the lots. It is questionable that the legislature intended that
the threat or likelihood of stripping the endowment should endure through
successive growths (with no new consideration for the intended bene
ficiaries) until incorporation or organization of the township.
Unlike the deed in Donworth, the timber and grass deeds specify that
upon the organization of a township upon the lot, all rights thereunder
conveyed are to terminate. It seems clear that the legislature was aware
that the organization or incorporation of the township in which the public
lot is situated would not in fact occur in some townships for a long time.
Governor Dana, in his message to the legislature, delivered May 14,
1849, said:185
The timber townships contain far the most valuable reservations [of
public lots], while they generally hold out but small inducement to settle
ments. Undoubtedly the largest receipts [from stumpage sales] will be
from reservations in township [sic] which will remain unoccupied for
centuries.

It seems equally clear that incorporation was fully expected to occur in
the foreseeable future in other townships. The question is whether the
fact that this event was correctly predicted to be in distant future, if
ever for some townships, means that the legislature must have intended
to convey on all townships something greater than all timber then in exis
tence. While the words of the timber and grass deeds appear to convey
a right of unlimited and potentially perpetual duration, the words of the
deeds in Donworth and other cases also appear to convey rights of un
limited duration. By defining the precise timber which timber rights
cover, courts have, in effect, severely limited the scope of rights conveyed
by timber deeds. There are a number of factual and legal reasons why the
same rationale applied in Donworth and in other cases preventing the
creation of the right to successive growths for an indefinite period of
time, apply to the timber and grass deeds.
The cutting rights conveyed in the deed in Donworth provided no
definite expiration date but permitted the grantees to cut “from time to
time to suit their convenience.” The court held that this language per
mitted the grantees to cut until the exhaustion of the growth existing at
the time of the conveyance, or until the expiration of an express or im
plied time limit. In Donworth, the growth was exhausted before suit was
brought and the court did not consider whether, in fact, any time limit
was implied in the deed. The rule is, however, that where no time limit
is supplied in a timber deed, the courts will require that the timber con185

Message of the Governor, May 14, 1849, [1849] Resolves of Maine at 196.
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veyed be removed within a reasonable time.186 The construction of the
Donworth deed that but a single growth was conveyed and the judicially
supplied “reasonable time” limit are both manifestations of the reluctance
of courts to construe timber deeds as having conveyed perpetual or in
definite cutting rights.
It is possible for parties to a timber deed to agree upon perpetual tim
ber rights in the grantee, but where such rights are not clearly contem
plated by the timber deed, they will not ordinarily be implied since they
are extremely burdensome.187 Thus, one “who claims an unlimited and
perpetual time for removal of timber from the land of another must
establish it by clear and definite language in his deed or contract.” 188
There are no Maine cases upholding either a perpetual right to remove
a single conveyed growth or successive growths. There are several cases in
this state, however, expressly refusing to so construe timber deeds. In
Pease v. Gibson,189 for example, a timber deed conveyed all “pine trees fit
for mill logs” and gave the grantee two years to remove them. In answer
to the defendant’s argument that the deed passed title to successive
growths, the court stated:190
The purchaser, on this principle, might, by gradually cutting the trees
and clearing them away, make room for a succeeding growth; and before
he would have removed the trees standing on the land at the time of
receiving such a license or sale, others would grow to a sufficient size
to be useful and valuable, and thus the owner of the land would be com
pletely deprived of all use o f it. Principles leading to such consequences
as we have mentioned cannot receive the sanction of this court.

The public policy underlying the rule set forth in Pease v. Gibson is that
it occasions public inconvenience and injury to allow the grantee the
perpetual right to cut and carry away timber upon a tract of land. A
right for an indefinite period of time operates to deprive the owner of the
land of the privilege of making other productive use of the land. Where
the owner of the land is the state and where the income and profits from
the land have been dedicated by the state for a public purpose, common
sense dictates that the inconvenience and injury thus caused to the public
is immeasurably greater than in the case of the purely private rights
which were litigated in Pease v. Gibson.
186

Penley v. Emmons, 117 Me. 108, 102 A. 972 (1918). See also 1 T hompson

5103.
[A] contract giving the vendee the perpetual right to enter and remove
timber from land is so unreasonable in its nature that no agreement will
be construed as conferring this right unless the intention of the parties
so to do is plainly manifested.

187

1 T hompson §102.
Clyde v. Walker, 220 Ore. 137, 139, 348 P.2d 1104, 1106 (1960).
Me. 81 (1829).
190 Id. at 84-85. See also Webber v. Proctor, 89 Me. 404, 36 A. 631 (1896).
188

180 6
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The cutting rights granted in the timber and grass deeds expire upon
the incorporation, or organization for plantation or election purposes,
of the township or tract from which the public lot was reserved.191 The
precise time when that event may occur is now, and doubtless was in
1850, completely unknown. Rights under some timber and grass deeds
have been terminated by the organization of townships. Obviously, how
ever, most such tracts or townships are still not incorporated and the
present owners of rights conveyed by the state under the timber and
grass deeds continue to cut timber and grass from those public lots.
If one assumes that population growth in the unorganized territory of
Maine is unpredictable, then the rights conveyed by the timber and grass
deeds might, with the same legal implications, have been keyed to ex
pire with the construction of the first railroad through the unorganized
territory or any other presumably inevitable future event.192 The par
ticular event specified could have occurred with respect to any given
timber and grass deed immediately after delivery of the deed193 and, as
the court has noted, it may never occur.194 While the timber and grass
Bragg v. Burleigh, 61 Me. 444 (1871). See pp. 263-66 infra.
In Dunn v. Forrester, 181 Ark. 696, 27 S.W.2d 1005 (1930), the timber deed
provided for timber “to be cut and paid for within two years after the completion
of a railroad down Mill Creek.” After twenty years the railroad had not been
built and the landowners sought to terminate cutting rights. The court noted that
the parties had thought a railroad would be constructed in the near future which
would afford a suitable means o f marketing the timber after it was cut, and that,
in fact, railroad rights o f way had already been acquired by the railroad in that
locality when the timber was conveyed. The court found that those facts negatived
an intention to convey a perpetual right to enter on the land and cut and remove
trees, and applied the rule that where a time is not specified for the performance of
a contract, it should be performed within a reasonable time.
193 In Bragg v. Burleigh, 61 Me. 444 (1871), the timber grantee was unable
to cut any timber under his timber and grass deed prior to organization o f the
township as a plantation.
194 Union Parish Soc’y v. Upton, 74 Me. 545, 548 (1883); State v. Mullen, 97
Me. 331, 338, 54 A. 841, 844 (1 903). It is interesting to note that the original
owners of the timber and grass as well as their current successors in interest have
actively prevented actual settlement of the townships involved by refusing to sell
their lands or to allow them to be settled.
191

192

[Maine] wanted a wise public land policy, that would make the acquisi
tion of farms easy as possible to actual settlers, and prevent the sale
of large tracts of lands to speculators. They got the reverse of this. . . .
All of the unimproved lands which the State once owned are now the
property of capitalists who do not live in the country and who oppose
rather than favor settlements.
Quoted from a Boston newspaper o f 1886 in C. Smith , A H istory of L umbering
M aine, 1861-1960 at 187 (1 9 7 2 ). The policy apparently continues in the form
of leases of land which prohibit year round occupancy of the lands.

in
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deeds did not purport to convey perpetual cutting rights, the grantees and
their successors in interest have enjoyed just that. After more than 120
years of cutting, the time when the wildlands will be incorporated or
organized is now as unforeseeable and unpredictable as it has ever been.
The timber and grass deeds do not clearly and explicitly convey suc
cessive growths, and such rights arise only by the implication that the
grantees are entitled to cut successive growths. This implication is not
favored when private persons grant timber rights.195 Where the grantor
is the sovereign power not acting in a purely commercial capacity, the im
plication is particularly not favored.196 It has been held that grants of
timber from the United States, like grants of land from the United States
“must be construed favourably to the Government and that nothing passes
but what is conveyed in clear and explicit language— inferences being
resolved not against but for the Government.” 197 The purported con
veyance of successive growths of timber are and were in 1850 not only
extremely rare, but not “favored” or implied in the law. The legislature
is presumed to have been cognizant of earlier judicial decisions in this
state that such conveyances are not favored. It is reasonable to assume
that the legislature would have expressed itself with the utmost clarity
if, in fact, it truly intended to convey successive growths of timber.
Moreover, while centuries may elapse before the incorporation or or
ganization of the wildlands, the state did not treat the public lots as if
incorporation would not actually occur. Instead, all of the public lots
were treated as if they were, at some foreseeable time, to be incorporated
or organized. No distinction was made in the sale of timber and grass
rights between the so-called agricultural lands and timber lands, if indeed
any would have been factually justified.198 Further, public lots were only
reserved from townships which, since 1824, had by legislative definition
been declared to be “suitable for settlement.” 199 The 1850 legislation
directed that separate accounts be opened up in the name of each town
ship and funds in those accounts be carried forward by the state treasurer
Pease v. Gibson, 6 Me. 81 (1829).
Donworth v. Sawyer, 94 Me. 242, 252, 47 A. 54, 523 (1900).
197United States v. State Box Co. 219 F. Supp. 684 (N .D . Cal. 1963), affd,
321 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1963) (striking down an alleged conveyance of perpetual
timber rights by the United States).
198 See Message of former Governor Hubbard, [1853] Resolves of Maine at 61.
Governor Hubbard states that the segregation o f agricultural from timber lands
for purposes of public management is totally unwarranted and that “like the
rest of our state, these two descriptions of land are so intermingled and arranged
as to render their interest one and inseparable.”
199 Ch. 280, Pub. Laws of 1824. The provision that public lots were only to be
reserved from townships “suitable for settlement” was apparently in effect until
the effective date of the Revised Statutes of 1857.
195
196
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until the towns or plantations “shall hereafter exist,” 200 and, of course,
it is unlikely that the legislature intended to create a cumbersome and
elaborate system of accounts to hold funds for centuries. Finally, regard
less of any dire predictions in 1850 concerning the reality of settlement
prospects for the wildlands, it seems to have been universally hoped at
that time that all of the wildlands would, in fact, soon be settled. A per
suasive argument can be made that despite the fears and opinions publicly
and privately voiced by individuals, the expressed intent of the legislature
was that the unorganized territory be organized and the cutting rights
terminate within a comparably short period of time.
Moreover, some townships were organized (and rights terminated)
very shortly after the timber and grass rights were sold.201 Logically,
identical deeds for identical purposes covering identical types of property
for an identical consideration pursuant to an identical enabling statute
by the same grantor ought to convey approximately similar interests.
If all timber and grass deeds are construed as having conveyed succes
sive growths with a period of time to remove those growths, there would
be an indefinite disparity between the actual amount and value of timber
conveyed by and cut under various timber and grass deeds, depending
on when or if those townships were incorporated. On the other hand, if
the timber and grass deeds conveyed but a single growth, and a period
within which to remove that growth which could be extremely short or
long, the differences between what two identical deeds conveyed are
narrowed, at least, to the limits of a single growth.
In addition, there is strong evidence that the dominant and immediate
objective of the legislature in 1850 in authorizing the sale of timber and
grass rights upon the public lots was to salvage some value of the timber
thereon from the rampant timber trespasses occurring at the time and
to avoid the formidable enforcement problems involved in the prevention
of trespasses. Such an objective is not incompatible with the conveyance
of a single growth of timber, since it was the existing growth of valuable
timber which was being subjected to trespass. Once the public lots were
cut over and the timber removed, the loss from subsequent timber tres
passes would obviously be diminished. Moreover, if only a single growth
were conveyed, then if the forest replaced itself after having been once
removed, the state could later resell the cutting rights on the succeeding
growth.
The intent to reserve subsequent growths of timber seems more com
patible with the state’s intent to maximize the endowment and prevent
theft, than does the intent to sell successive growths. It seems clear that
this endowment was intended to be increased in value during the time
200
201

Ch. 196, § 6 , Pub. Laws of 1850. The accounts are still being carried forward.
See, e.g., Bragg v. Burleigh, 61 Me. 444 (1871).
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title to the public lots remained vested in the state. It follows that the state
may have intended to sell only that which was being lost to thieves, not
everything of value which could conceivably grow to be worth stealing.
This seems particularly true because the consideration received by the
state was related to the existing growth of timber on the lots.202 In any
event, the purpose of salvaging whatever was left from the trespasses and
obtaining value for the benefit of future citizens of the state does not re
quire the conveyance of successive growths for an indefinite and poten
tially perpetual period of time.203
The courts of Maine have demonstrated a propensity to determine
what was conveyed by a timber deed in light of the amount and adequacy
of the consideration paid. In Penley v. Emmons,204 the court determined
the “reasonable time” for the removal of timber by reference to the
dollar amount of the consideration paid.205 Similarly, in Donworth v.
Sawyer, the court held:206
Here the consideration was $17,479.96. This grant is clearly enough of
pine and spruce trees standing on the land at the date of the deed, and
of none other, to be removed at the convenience of the grantees or
their assigns.

The consideration paid by the grantees of the timber and grass deeds
for the vast majority of the public lots ranged from $50 to $350 each
(five to thirty-five cents per acre).207 Chapter 196 of the Public Laws
of 1850 required that the timber and grass be sold “at the same rate per
acre as the tract or township shall or may have sold for, making, how202 See Letter from the Land Agent to the Legislature, April 6 , 1852, M e . H.
D oc. No. 49 (1852), discussing the direct relationship between the marketability
and value of the right to cut and carry away the timber on the public lots and the
value of the timber then standing thereon. See also Maine Land A gents’ R e 
ports, 1840-56, Report of G.C. Getchell, 1854, to the effect that the value of the
public lots and the prices received for the timber and grass sales therefrom were
“greatly diminished” by trespasses.
203 In United States v. State Box Co., 219 F. Supp. 684 (N .D . Cal. 1963), aff’d,
321 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1963), the court held that the purposes of certain timber
grants by the United States in the 19th century was to aid in the construction of
railroads by giving the builders sources o f income and credit, and that the achieve
ment of that purpose did not require that the grant of timber be perpetual.
204 117 Me. 108, 102 A. 972 (1 918). The deed conveyed a lot or parcel of
poplar, bass wood, and white birch timber and gave the grantees the right to
enter and remove the same at their convenience.
205 “[Twenty] years or more in which to remove $60 worth o f standing growth
is not a reasonable time . . .” Id. at 112, 102 A. 974.
206 94 Me. at 252, 47 A. at 523. The consideration covered 4,000 acres of land
in fee simple and cutting rights for 21,040 acres of the township. N o breakdown
is given.
207 See 1963 R eport, prepared by the State Forestry Department pursuant to
Ch. 76, Resolves o f 1961.
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ever, such reasonable deduction for the soil as in the opinion of the
[land] agent should be made.” 208 The average price received by the
state of Maine for the sale of public domain from separation through
1855 was approximately sixty cents per acre, and the average price
received for timber and grass rights sold on approximately 285,000
acres of public lots from 1850 through 1857 was approximately 30 cents
per acre.209
If the state intended to sell no more than that for which it received
consideration, it seems unlikely that the legislature actually intended
future or successive growths of timber be conveyed. Just as it is reason
able to assume the purchasers were paying for the growth in existence
at the time, it is reasonable to assume that the state was selling only
that same existent growth. The statute called for a deduction in the pur
chase price for the value of the “soil.” What would the deduction for
the soil include if not the future product of the soil? The legislature
did not convey the fee simple and reserve the minerals. The sale of
successive growths of timber would constitute, in effect, a sale of the
soil or, at least, most surface rights. If the consideration received by
the state does not exceed the value of the timber in existence at the time,
it seems both fair and logical to grant the sovereign the presumption
that the value of existing timber was all the sovereign intended to convey.
There is, therefore, a distinct possibility that the legislature of 1850
intended to convey no more than the right to cut and carry away the
timber which existed at the time, with the right to cut and carry it away
to extend until the incorporation or organization of the township in which
the public lot is located, or the exhaustion of the growth existing at the
time of the conveyance. Subject to the remote possibility that a relatively
small quantity of original growth is still standing, it is safe to assume
that the timber in existence when the timber and grass deeds were de
livered has been cut.
While that is all that the legislature of 1850 may have intended to
grant, beginning approximately when the first growth would have been
removed, the state began to operate upon the assumption that the right
included successive growths of timber. In 1897, in Chapter 316 of the
Public Laws of 1897, the legislature authorized the taxation of the
timber and grass on the public lots. After the turn of the century, the
state embarked upon a program of leasing camp lots on public lots and
sharing the rental equally with the successors in interest of the grantees
of the timber and grass. Moreover, timber and grass rights were assigned
Ch. 196, Pub. Laws of 1850.
Figures compiled from M aine L and A gents’ R eports 1840-1856, Report
of G.C. Getchell, 1855, at 8 , and from a survey of M aine Land A gents’ R eports,
1840-56.
208

209
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by the grantees and there were successive assignments of the rights from
private party to private party continuing to the present time. Finally,
of course, the grantees and their successors openly assumed full control
over the public lots.
While the assumptions concerning the scope of the timber and grass
rights were not examined by the courts, the passage of so many decades
with the full acquiescence of the state in the arrangement carries its own
weight. Nevertheless, to the extent that the rights of the parties are fixed
by the terms of enactments involved, the widespread and long-standing
assumption is merely an assumption, not an established right and not the
same as a conveyance. Nor should such an assumption operate in this
instance to bar assertion of any original rights. It seems unlikely that
the elements of laches or estoppel exist by virtue of the lapse of time
and acquiescence, because the lapse of time and acquiescence has, in
large measure, inured to the benefit, not to the detriment, of private
parties. Even if detrimental reliance could be demonstrated in a special
situation, laches and estoppel are generally not available as defenses
against the sovereign when it is acting with regard to its public lands.
Thus, the rights conveyed under the timber and grass deeds may have
expired. This conclusion is based on the facts that (1 ) the timber and
grass deeds do not clearly and explicitly convey future or successive
growths of timber; (2 ) there are indications that the state did not intend
to convey successive growths; (3 ) time and history, not the unequivocal
intent of the state expressed in the language of the deeds, has awarded
successive growths on many of the public lots; and (4 ) the duration of
the cutting rights provided in the timber and grass deeds is so indefinite
as to amount to a purported conveyance of a perpetual right to cut tim
ber. The conclusion that the rights conveyed have expired is reinforced
by the fact diat the word “timber” in a timber deed in Maine ordinarily
means the timber or growth in existence at the time of the grant. In
addition, the judicially declared public policy in Maine is against con
struing timber deeds as having conveyed away successive growths or
perpetual cutting rights, especially where the grantor is the sovereign.
One may be unable to express the unqualified opinion that the cutting
rights have expired, but this is not a “case where either necessity or
public policy [would invoke] the court to interpose its powers of con
struction at the extreme limits of its authority.” 210 If a private person
210
Bragg v. Burleigh, 61 Me. 444, 451 (1871). After holding that the rights un
der a timber and grass deed had expired by the organization of a plantation,
though not a single tree had been cut, the court went on to say:

The plaintiffs are presumed to know the law. They took their deed under
the law, and must be content with what the law gives them. The legis
lature, and not this court, is the tribunal for hearing and deciding upon
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had executed and delivered a deed identical in all respects to the timber
and grass deeds and if, pursuant to that deed, all of the growth existing
at the time of the conveyance had been exhausted, it is likely that the
court would rule that the cutting rights had expired. The same result
ought to obtain more forcefully when the grantor of the cutting rights is
the sovereign acting in its capacity as trustee of a charitable endowment.
B.

When Do the Rights Terminate?
Assuming that the timber and grass deeds conveyed cutting rights for
a potentially unlimited number of successive growths of timber, then the
cutting rights conveyed would terminate on the incorporation or organiza
tion as a plantation of the township from which the public lot was
reserved.211 It is clear that the rights terminate immediately and abso
lutely upon the occurrence of that event.212 In addition, unless a contrary
legislative intent is expressed, the cutting rights for the entire public
lot terminate upon the incorporation or organization of only a portion of
the township, regardless of whether the incorporated or organized area
physically includes the entire public lot.213
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state and
enjoy full corporate status. In the early days of the settlement of this
country, the term “plantation” was used to describe a “cluster or body of
persons inhabiting near each other.” 214215*While it was often used inter
changeably with “town” or “township,” it seems originally to have been
used to describe a “settlement.” As distinctions developed between the
various types of local political entities and subdivisions, the plantation
came to be categorized as merely a quasi-corporation.218 Originally,
the equities of the plaintiffs’ case, if any they have to present, this court
at least, will take care that they do not despoil the beneficiaries o f this
limitation of the land agent’s authority, guaranteed to them by the
plighted faith of the State.

Id.
211 Substantially all timber and grass deeds prior to 1873 provide that the right
to cut and carry away the timber and grass shall continue “until the said town
ship or tract shall be incorporated, or organized, for plantation purposes, and no
longer.” In 1873, a handful o f timber and grass deeds provided for termination
when the “township or tract shall be incorporated, and no longer,” and thereafter
substantially all timber and grass deeds provided that the timber and grass rights
continue until the “township or tract shall be incorporated into a town or or
ganized into a plantation and no longer.” For an example of the latter form o f deed,
see 2 R ecord of D eeds, T imber on R eserved L ands 159, on file in the Maine
State Archives.
212 Bragg v. Burleigh, 61 Me. 444 (1871).
213 State v. Mullen, 87 Me. 331, 338, 54 A. 841 (1903).
214 Commonwealth v. City o f Roxbury, 75 Mass. 451, 485 (1857).
215 Blakesburg v. Jefferson, 7 Me. 125 (1830); Means v. Blakesburg, 7 Me. 132
(1830).
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plantations were authorized to be organized by the treasurer of the
state when a tax was levied upon a given area.216 Those plantations
possessed some, but not all, of the powers of towns and functioned as a
“junior” form of town for most purposes, including taxation, elections,
education, support of the poor, and the maintenance of roads.217 These
municipal entities were generally referred to as “organized plantations.”
In 1840, the legislature authorized the organization of a more rudi
mentary form of plantation.218 The organization was permitted upon a
petition to and warrant from the county commissioners. The sole pur
pose of this form of organization was to cast ballots for President, VicePresident, representatives to Congress, Governor, Senators, representa
tives to the state legislature and county officers, and to elect three
“assessors” and a clerk to administer the calling of an annual meeting and
elections. Though called assessors, these functionaries apparently had
no taxing powers. This type of plantation came to be referred to as a
plantation organized “for election purposes.” Plantations organized for
election purposes accumulated some of the powers of other plantations,
including the power to provide for support of the poor and to build
schools and organize school districts.
Originally there were no limitations on the size or population of or
ganized plantations (those organized pursuant to the levy of a tax upon
an unorganized area) or of plantations organized for election purposes.
In 1857, but apparently not before, the former type of plantation was
limited to single townships containing at least 300 persons.219 Plantations
organized for election purposes continued with no such limitations, but
were limited to a single township in 1859.220
Chapter 196 of the Public Laws of 1850 authorized the conveyance
of timber and grass on the public lots in townships which were not in
corporated or organized for election purposes until the township or tract
was incorporated or “organized for plantation purposes.” 221 The same
Act gave custody of the public lots in single townships organized for
election purposes to the assessors of such plantations and granted powers
to election plantations to prevent trespass on the public lots. The Act
Ch. 106, §8 , Pub. Laws o f 1821.
217 See, e.g., M e . R ev. Stat. ch. 14, §44 (1841); Id., ch. 17, §62, and ch. 25,
§43. With respect to some municipal concerns, however, plantations had the power
to perform the function, whereas towns had the duty to perform them. See Blakes
burg v. Jefferson, 7 Me. 125 (1830).
218 Ch. 89, Pub. Laws of 1840. The provisions appeared at M e . R ev . Stat. ch.
4, §§70-78 (1857). Because it was passed at an “extra session” o f the 1840 legis
lature, it appears as an “Amendment” in the Revised Statutes of 1841.
219 ME. R ev. Stat. ch. 3, §33 (1857).
220 Me . R ev. Stat. ch. 4, §70 (1857).
221 Ch. 196, §2, Pub. Laws of 1850.
216
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mentions plantations in several sections, and each reference is clearly
to plantations organized for election purposes. The single, rather ambig
uous, exception is that the right to cut and carry away the timber and
grass was to continue until the township was organized “for plantation
purposes.” The question raised by this particular phraseology is whether
Chapter 196 of the Public Laws of 1850 authorized timber rights which
would continue beyond the organization of the township for election
purposes. Because the power of the Land Agent to sell timber was
limited to totally unorganized townships, it would logically follow that
the right to cut the timber would not survive organization of the town
ship which terminated the Land Agent’s power to sell. That is to say, if
the power to sell and the right to cut are coterminous, organization of a
township for election purposes would terminate the cutting rights. If
they are not coterminous, then an anomalous situation results in which
the Land Agent could sell the right to cut and carry away the timber
on a public lot in an unorganized township, while rights would sur
vive an organization of the township into an election plantation even
though the election plantation would have custody of the public lot and
would be required to protect it from trespass. The result is illogical. It
hardly seems compatible with the objective of promoting settlement
to preper any form of plantation, election or otherwise, in favor of a
timber grantee.
The issue of the legal effect of the words “for plantation purposes”
in Chapter 196 of the Public Laws of 1850 has never been squarely de
cided.222 In Bragg v. Burleigh223 in 1871 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine had occasion to construe a timber and grass deed delivered under
the Revised Statutes of 1857 in order to determine whether the deed
terminated upon organization of the township for election purposes. The
deed was delivered in 1862 and while it was in the same form as all
other timber and grass deeds since 1850, the precise wording of the
statute had been changed.224 First, the court ruled that the authority of
the Land Agent is conferred by statute, that he cannot exceed that
authority or enlarge the rights of grantees by recitals in the deed, and
that grantees are charged with knowledge of the limitations upon his
authority. The court held specifically that the cutting rights conveyed
under the timber and grass deed terminated upon the organization of
the township or tract as a plantation, regardless of whether it was or
ganized “for plantation purposes” or for “election purposes” despite the

222 But see Prentiss v. Davis, 83 Me. 364, 22 A. 246 (1891).
223 61 Me. 444 (1871).
224

m e.

R ev. Stat. ch. 5, §11 (1857).
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fact that the plaintiff’s deed recited that right terminated only upon or
ganization “for plantation purposes.” 225
As a result of Bragg v. Burleigh, all cutting rights conveyed under
timber and grass deeds delivered pursuant to the provisions of chapter
5, section 11 of the Revised Statutes of 1857, were keyed to terminate
upon the organization of the township into a plantation even if the or
ganization was merely for election purposes.226 The writ of replevin
commencing Bragg v. Burleigh (Burleigh was then Land Agent of the
state) was dated June 11, 1869. During the immediately succeeding
session of the legislature and while the case was pending, the pertinent
provisions of the Revised Statutes were amended to permit the Land
Agent to “sell the timber and grass [on the public lots], or the right to
cut the same . . . until incorporated into a town, for such sum as he thinks
just and reasonable.” 227 In other words, no organization of a township
into any kind of plantation was to terminate cutting rights sold there
after under the public laws. Only the incorporation of the township “into
a town” was to accomplish this. In addition, the legislature during the
same legislative session (1870) abolished plantations organized for
election purposes. This was accomplished by establishing a new format
for the organization of all plantations and by providing that the provisions
of the Revised Statutes of 1857 authorizing organization for election
The court arrived at this conclusion after observing:
The legislation o f the State upon this subject prior to the revision of 1857
changed several times, sometimes admitting plantations organized for
election purposes to the benefit of this limitation, and sometimes ex
cluding them therefrom, according, it would seem, as the influence of
interests of the settlers, or o f the lumbermen controlled the action of the
legislature. The eminent jurist who had charge of the revision of the
statutes of 1857, could not have been ignorant of the history of this
legislation, or the causes that gave rise to such legislative vacillation. He
was too well versed in lexicography, as well as judicial lore, not to un
derstand that meaning o f language, or the legal effect of changing the
phraseology of a statute. Nor was he accustomed to change such
phraseology without a purpose. He omitted the words “for plantation
purposes” in the revised code o f 1857, the manifest purpose and legal
effect o f which, in connection with the other language used in the revi
sion, are to restore the inhabitants of plantations, organized for election
purposes, to the rights they enjoyed in an earlier period of the legislation
upon this subject.
226 The dicta in the decision would indicate that there were changes in legisla
tion between 1850 and 1857 which may have brought some timber and grass deeds
during that period under the rule. The only legislative change which has been found
was ch. 284, Pub. Laws o f 1852, granting custody of public lots in election planta
tions to the Land Agent. It seems doubtful that this legislative change had the
result the court rather casually suggested it did.
227 Ch. 135, §2, Pub. Laws of 1870. Bragg held that this act had no retroactive
effect. 61 Me. at 446.
225
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purposes should (without affecting exisiting plantations) apply only to
plantations duly organized under the new law.228
The abolition of the distinction prevented the termination of every
timber and grass deed dated between January 1, 1858 and March 14,
1870 upon the organization of the particular tract or township as a plan
tation regardless of whether the organization was for election purposes
or otherwise. If the distinction were recreated today, the state presumably
would be in the same position it occupied prior to the abolition of the
distinction with respect to timber and grass deeds between the two dates.
After 1870, however, the Land Agent apparently continued for a few
years to use the old form of timber and grass deed providing for termina
tion upon organization for “plantation purposes.” While Bragg v. Bur
leigh held that recitals in a timber and grass deed could not enlarge the
rights of the grantee beyond those authorized by statute, it did not
squarely face the issue of whether provisions of the deed could diminish
the rights of the grantee below those authorized by statute. Because
of the recitals in the deeds, therefore, the rights may terminate upon
organization of the townships involved “for plantation purposes,” not
withstanding the fact that the legislation then in effect authorized a con
veyance of rights until incorporation of the township.
In addition, all timber and grass deeds after 1874 were authorized by
a single Resolve229 or, in some deeds, used the same form for conveyances
pursuant to that Resolve. These deeds provide, in the words of the Re
solve, that the cutting rights terminate when the township is “incorporat
ed into a town or organized into a plantation.” Though the distinction be
tween plantations organized for different purposes had been abolished ap
proximately four years prior to that Resolve, nevertheless the legislature
is presumed to have used that language with the knowledge that various
classes of plantations had existed in various forms from time to time dur
ing the immediately preceding 30 years, and of the distinction in wording
which was the basis of the decision in Bragg v. Burleigh in 1871. Ac
cordingly, cutting rights under most timber and grass deeds after 1874
probably would terminate upon the organization of those townships for
election purposes, if that kind of organization were again authorized or
created by the legislature.
The present law provides for only one kind of plantation and that
plantations are not, among other things, to be composed of more than
228 Ch. 121, §17, Pub. Laws o f 1870, amending M e . R ev. Stat. ch. 4, §77 (1857).
The format provided in chapter 121 for the organization of plantations includes
such limitations as a maximum o f one township per plantation and a minimum of
250 inhabitants per plantation. The present law contains similar provisions without
population limits.
229 Ch. 319, [1874] Resolves of Maine.
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one township.230 As pointed out above, however, there have existed in
the past other forms of plantations.231 Moreover there were apparently
no area limitations in effect for “organized plantations” prior to
January 1, 1858232 and none for plantations organized for election pur
poses until April 4, 1859.233 That is to say, when the majority of timber
and grass deeds were authorized and delivered and the rights under those
deeds fixed, limitations such as those which exist today regarding area
and purpose of organization did not exist. Historically, many plantations
consisted of more than one township.234 There is precedent since the
enactment of provisions substantially similar to those in effect today for
the organization pursuant to a special act of the legislature of a single
plantation containing four townships.235
In summary, the rights conveyed by the state in substantially all tim
ber and grass deeds terminate upon the incorporation into a town or
upon the organization into a plantation of all or a portion of the tract
or township from which the public lot was reserved.236 If municipal
organization fairly approximating the form and purposes of organization
which existed during the middle of the nineteenth century were brought
to unorganized areas of the state, it seems fair to conclude that the event
specified in most of the timber and grass deeds would have occurred,
and such rights under those deeds as still exist would terminate.

230 M e. R ev. Stat. A nn . tit. 30, §5616 (1964).
Although dicta in Bragg indicates that there is a distinction between the words
“for plantation purposes” in ch. 196, Pub. Laws of 1850 and an organization for
election purposes, it also indicated that legislative changes between 1850 and
1857 may have created different rights in different years. The language, however,
is mere dicta, and the issue of the legal effect of the words “for plantation purposes”
was not squarely before the court. The right to cut the timber on approximately
250,000 acres of public lots was conveyed over the years 1850-1857.
^ E ffe c tiv e date of the 1857 Revised Statutes. Prior to that date, plantations
were authorized to organize for taxation (plantation) purposes “within such ter
ritorial limits as [the inhabitants] deem proper.” M e . R ev. Stat. ch. 14, §44 (1841).
233 Ch. 106, Pub. Laws of 1859.
234 Prentiss v. Davis, 83 Me. 364, 371, 22 A. 246, 248 (1891).
235 Allagash Plantation, organized pursuant to ch. 177, Priv. and Sp. Laws of
1875.
236 This probably includes a broader range of organization than is now per
mitted. The word “plantation” was originally used to describe a settlement and
gradually came to be used to describe various forms of municipal organization of
persons in a settlement or a settled area. The rules applicable to plantation
organization have not always been fixed or rigid, but have fluctuated and changed
on many occasions in Maine’s history and throughout the period in which the
cutting rights on the public lots were sold. The power to define and create munici
palities has always belonged exclusively to the state.
231
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C.

The State and the Owners of the Timber and Grass Rights

1.

Located Public Lots
In terms of the duration and definition of the cutting rights conveyed
under the timber and grass deeds, it makes no difference whether the in
terest conveyed is characterized as a profit a prendre or a fee simple
interest in the timber and grass.237 There is no practical distinction be
tween the possessory rights enjoyed by the owner of a profit and the
owner of an estate in timber. Timber itself, as opposed to the air space
between standing timber, is from a practical standpoint incapable of
possession until it has been cut and converted into personalty. Although
the owner of a profit a prendre in timber has a right to enter the land
to cut and remove the timber,238 a right of entry is not equivalent to
ownership of the surface. Instead, the right of entry may be exercised only
for the purpose of exercising cutting rights.239 Regardless of the name
used to describe the interest of the timber owners in the public lots,
therefore, the timber and grass deeds did not convey surface rights to the
public lots, but only the right to do whatever is reasonably necessary for
the proper exercise of the right to cut and to carry away the timber and
grass. Conceivably the right to cut and carry away timber could at a
given time preclude other surface possession,240 but the state clearly owns
the surface rights of the public lots where the timber and grass has been
sold.
The owners of the timber and grass rights probably have a right of
ejectment.241 This right has significant practical implications. During the
time that there is no exercise of the right to cut and carry away the timber
and grass, the state is entitled to exclusive possession and technically has
the exclusive power to enjoy the surface rights. In other words, the state
alone enjoys the benefits of surface ownership and has the exclusive
right to receive all sources of income except the value of the timber and
grass. This clearly would include overnight camping fees and other
sources of income compatible with the right of the timber owners to
cut and carry away timber and grass. But in the case of long term camp
site leases, for example, there is a practical conflict between the rights
of the state and the timber owners. If the owners of the timber and grass
237 See pp. 243-61 supra.
238 See Luccock, Tim ber Deeds— A Case for the Restatement o f the Laws of
Property, 20 W ash. L. R ev. 199, 204 (1945); Beckwith v. Rossi, 157 Me. 532, 175
A.2d 732 (1961); 1 T hompson §103.
239 Reed v. Merrifield, 51 Mass. 155, 159 (1845).
240 See 1 T hompson §§135, 136.
241 See Stetson v. Grant, 102 Me. 222, 6 6 A. 480 (1906); Walters v. Sheffield,
75 Fla. 505, 78 So. 539 (1918). See also Luccock, Timber D eeds—A Case for the
Restatement o f the Law of Property, 20 Wash. L. R ev. 199, 204 (1945).
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own the rights to an indefinite number of successive growths of timber,
these rights could not be frustrated by the state’s use of the lot in a
manner which would prevent successive growths of timber or grass. Thus,
it seems logical that in this situation the owners of the timber and grass
would have the right to prevent the state from unilaterally leasing a
public lot to be paved and used as a parking lot. To the extent that annual
campsite or other leases could be shown to have a similar effect, it
would logically follow that the owners of the timber and grass could
prevent the proposed use.
Moreover, the timber owners would have the right to cut all of the
growth they own and because their rights are superior to the state’s
lessees, the timber owners could conceivably strip a campsite of timber
and grass. Thus, the owners of the cutting rights, while not entitled to
possession of the surface, have a form of veto power over the ability of
the state to make substantial use of the land. While the state did not con
vey the surface rights, the net effect of the conveyance is to prevent the
state from enjoying the more significant rewards of ownership of the
surface.
This rather harsh result from a mere timber conveyance is precisely
the rationale underlying Pease v. Gibson242 and other cases which hold
that perpetual or indefinite cutting rights are not deemed to have been
conveyed in the absence of clear and explicit language to that effect.
The inequality is further exacerbated by the fact that the timber owners
own only the value of the timber when it is cut and nothing more, yet
by receiving a proportion of rentals from campsites, they can receive
more income than the timber is actually worth. The timber owners are
therefore motivated not to cut at all but to enjoy what are basically the
fruits of the surface estate. While there are no doubt a number of factual
situations which can be tested in court,243 as a practical matter, in the
absence of further judicial clarification of the respective rights of the
parties, the full use and enjoyment of the surface of public lots may not
be secured to annual campsite lessees by the state alone. As long as this
remains the case, the agreement of the timber owners would be required,
and the manner in which the rentals were to be divided would be subject
to negotiation between the parties.
Me. 81 (1829).
The court declined, upon rather technical grounds, to meet the issue in
Stetson v. Grant, 102 Me. 222, 6 6 A. 480 (1906), a case involving an effort by a
timber and grass owner to eject the state’s lessee o f a public lot. The plaintiff
lost because he alleged that he owned the land in fee simple and, failing to show
such ownership, he was precluded from showing merely a superior right. Cf.
Rogers v. Biddeford & Saco Coal Co., 137 Me. 166, 16 A.2d 131 (1940). This
same issue is the subject of the pending litigation, Cushing v. Lund, Kennebec
Super. Ct. Doc. No. 1740-73 (filed May 16, 1973).
242 6
243
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The converse of the rule that the owner of the timber may do what
ever is reasonably necessary for the proper exercise of the right to cut
and carry away the timber is the rule that the owner of the timber may
not unreasonably impair the rights of the owner of the fee. It should be
noted that the owner of the fee has a cause of action to prevent and re
cover damages for damage to the fee caused by improper cutting methods
or other practices inconsistent with the timber operator’s duty to preserve
the value of the fee interest for the benefit of the owner.244 Tire rights
and obligations of the owners of the timber and grass rights and the state
are therefore not unlike those of the owners of the dominant and servient
estates in the use and enjoyment of easements proper.245
2.

Unlocated Public Lots

An assessment of the rights of the state in those townships where the
public lot has not been located and where the grass and timber has been
sold involves the application of rules previously discussed.246 In brief, the
state has all of the rights and obligations of a tenant in common in those
townships, less the right to share in the timber and grass. It also has, to
the extent of its fractional interest in the fee, the power to prevent
damage to or unreasonable use of the fee by the timber owners. In
Jasper Land Co. v. Manchester Sawmills,247 for example, the plaintiff
owned an undivided 49% interest in the fee simple (surface) and all
the minerals, but had conveyed “all the timber growing, standing, lying
or being upon the land.” The defendant’s licensor owned the remaining
undivided 51% of the fee and the timber on the entire tract. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant had used and threatened to continue to use a
“skidder or other machinery” which destroyed the young timber growth
on the land depriving the plaintiff of future growth, and which made
“great and unnecessary ditches, trenches and gulches in the surface of the
land,” thereby injuring the land. The court held that the plaintiff, as a
tenant in common of the fee, was entitled to enjoin its cotenant from
destroying and committing such waste upon the common property. It
is clear that the state has similar rights on the public lots.

244 See, e.g., Baca Land & Cattle Co. v. Savage, 440 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1971);
Jasper Land Co. v. Manchester Sawmills, 209 Ala. 446, 96 So. 417 (1923);
Williams v. Bruton, 121 S.C. 30, 113 S.E. 319 (1922); Furman v. A.C. Tuxbury
Land & Timber Co., 112 S.C. 71, 99 S.E. I l l (1919); Rice v. W. L. Robinson
Lumber Co., 110 Miss. 607, 70 So. 817 (1916); Ellerbe v. Marion County Lumber
Co., 99 S.C. 158, 82 S.E. 1049 (1914).
245See Beckwith v. Rossi, 157 Me. 532, 536, 175 A.2d 732, 735 (1961).
246 See pp. 242-43, 267-69 supra.
247 209 Ala. 446, 96 So. 417 (1923).
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III.

C o n c l u s io n

As the breadth of the foregoing study indicates, it would unduly pro
long this article to give an exhaustive legal analysis of all of the questions
raised by the public lots. It seems appropriate, however, to point to
some examples of current activities with regard to these lands, primarily
for purposes of illustration.
Although L.D. 1812 proposed and the court condoned248 the creation
of the power to sell and exchange public lots in order to make them more
accessible for public uses or to assemble larger contiguous quantities of
land, the legislature has not yet granted this power to the executive
branch of the state government. There exists at least one opportunity to
exchange a public lot located in an inaccessible portion of a township
in Washington County for comparable acreage in the same township with
substantial frontage upon a lake in an area which needs greater public
recreational opportunities. Although the landowner and the Department
of Conservation are in substantial agreement, no legislative authority
exists to consummate the exchange.
One of the most severe limitations to effective public use and enjoy
ment of the public lots has been lack of funds to manage the lands. The
lack of funds has resulted not only in poor forest management of those
lots on which the state has unquestioned title to the timber, but has
prevented the creation of an inventory of resources on the public lots.
Without an inventory, there can be no intelligent decisions about which
areas lend themselves to management for recreation, game, and other
uses. Instead of using the funds generated by the land to manage the
land for the public, the funds have been placed in a trust to await the
creation of towns. While the legislature abolished this system in the
106th Regular Session,249 as authorized by the Opinion of the Justices,250
in order to permit future revenues to be used for such management, the
106th Special Session changed the provision25125 to place income from
the public lots in the approximately forty plantations back into the trusts.
The Act grants only a marginal contribution to the cost of operating
schools in plantations,232 and the result is a major loss of revenue to
the new Bureau of Public Lands, which was created to manage the public
See pp. 237-38 supra.
Ch. 628, Pub. Laws o f 1973.
230 308 A .2d 253 (Me. 1973).
251 Ch. 797, Pub. Laws of 1973.
252 Income from those public lots under the new law is added to principal in the
Organized Townships Fund created by M e . R ev. Stat. A nn . tit. 30, §4166 (Supp.
1973). Income from all public lots in all plantations will not be used for the benefit
of all of the lands involved and the people o f the state. Instead, each plantation will
receive its proportionate share of the income each year.
248

249
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lots.253 The enactment was a step backward from the use of the remaining
public lots for the benefit of all of the people of the state.
Bills were introduced in the Regular and Special Sessions of the 106th
Legislature which would have taken steps to organize the unorganized
areas of Maine into plantations.254 Both bills purported to bring about an
organization for municipal purposes, potentially having the effect of
terminating the right to cut and carry away the timber and grass on the
public lots. Neither bill was enacted.
In the 106th Regular Session of the legislature, a bill was proposed
to authorize the conveyance of 160 acres of a public lot, without con
sideration, to a private citizen who claimed to own the public lot by the
right of adverse possession. Representatives from the Department of the
Attorney General and the Department of Conservation testified before the
legislative committee that the claimant did not own the land, by adverse
possession or otherwise. The bill passed,255 but the conveyance has been
delayed by the Attorney General while a determination is made whether
to test the legislation in court.
Litigation is pending to determine the extent of the timber and grass
rights.256 Even if the rights are declared to be as broad as the owners
of those rights have asserted, the area of uses of the surface of the public
lots by the public will remain largely unexplored. If the owner of the
surface of the land is under a legal duty to exercise rights of ownership
in a manner that does not unreasonably impair the rights of the timber
owner, it ought to follow that the owner of the timber is under the same
legal duty to exercise rights of ownership in a manner which does not
unreasonably impair the rights of the landowner. The landowner in this
case is, of course, the public at large.
To date, the focus upon the public lots has primarily concerned the
resolution of fundamental legal problems and policy objectives. The
Opinion of the Justices, and the 1973 legislation authorized thereby,
make the public lots worth a substantial investment by the state because
it authorizes the use of the lands now for benefit of all the people of the
state. The litigation involving the timber and grass will shed more light
upon the value to the state of the public lots and the propriety of a major
investment by the public in the inventory, management, and use of these
253 The Bureau was created within the Department of Conservation by ch. 460,
Pub. Laws of 1973.
254 L.D. No. 1812, H.P. 1382, “An Act to Organize the Unorganized and Deorganized Territories o f the State and to Provide for the Management of the
Public Reserved Lands,” introduced into the 106th Regular Session, and L.D. No.
2545, S.P. 920, “A n A ct to Organize the Mainland Unorganized and Deorganized
Territories of the State into Grand Plantations.”
255 Ch. 14 [1973] Resolves o f Maine.
256 Cushing, et al. v. Lund, et al., Kennebec Super. Ct. Doc. No. 1740-73.

271

MAINE LAW REVIEW

lands by the people. These fundamental questions obviously must, to
some extent, precede the great exploration and development of the public
lots for the new public uses which are now authorized. The state is only
slightly beyond the starting gate in its effort to discover what it has in the
form of public lots. No meaningful inventory of the lands presently exists.
Many of the located public lots on which the timber and grass were sold
were set off in early and imprecise surveys over a century ago, and bound
ary lines are either inaccurate or have become obliterated by time. Conse
quently, each of the hundreds of parcels of land and each of the common
and undivided interests in townships must be given individual adminis
trative attention.
Obviously, much must await future judicial, legislative, and adminis
trative determination. It is now clear, however, that there is a substantial
degree of public awareness of these lands. Through that awareness, the
groundwork is being laid for greater use and enjoyment of this great
public trust by the people of Maine.
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